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ABSTRACT
If the purpose of this thesis is to offer new insight
into the political thought of Relnhold Niebuhr, it will be seen
that the analysis must proceed in three stages.

Initially,

the problem will be to establish in theory some scheme by which
meaning can, in some degree, be brought to all political sys
tems, and through which certain fundamental characteristics,
found in some systems but not in others, may be permitted to
emerge.
tions.

This will involve the setting up of two extreme posi
The second problem will entail of course, clarifying

exactly what Relnhold Niebuhr’s political thought is.

Coinci

dent with, although logically distinguishable from, this, is
the third problem —

the task of applying the established

scheme to that particular political thought.
The two extreme positions will be called Political
Realism and Political Idealism, both of which are common terms
in political parlance.

Unfortunately however, it is the case

that neither of these concepts is susceptible to clear and
brief definition, and as such, neither has heretofore been ca
pable of anything mora than roughly indicating general predis

positions, and at times, fitting the biases of the person that
wields them.

Accordingly, it will be necessary to ground both

these labels in terms which neither equivocate nor beg the
question.
iii
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But while dealing with what are admittedly two "ideal”
types, it must be kept in mind that to demonstrate relevance
in any particular case, is not to prove thereby that this
scheme has the final word*

Insofar as it is the purpose of

this thesis to explain Niebuhr in these terms, it will be ar
gued that to understand Niebuhr’s thought is to be aware of
the way in which he combines elements of both schools.

But

Insofar as a proper perspective of the truth inhering in one's
own cause must be maintained, it will be observed, even if it
is only as an aside, that Niebuhr cannot ultimately be con
tained by the terms of this categorisation*
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FBEFACI

The French, It is said, and especially French academics,
have a genius for complex order#

That is to say, they seem to

take a positive delight in making a theoretical muchness out
of any simple assertion, and verge on ecstasy before the pros
pect of working an intricate balance and form into the pres
entation of that simple assertion.

They pale visibly at the

mention of what is generally known as muddled English pragma
tism, and certainly, if the Germans gave birth to the dialectic,
the French adopted it and raised it as their own.

Anyone who

has had the opportunity of sitting an exam composed by a nativeborn French scholar will testify to the necessity of approach
ing every problem In the following maimer*

1

) place the state

ment, question, or problem In its historical context or back
ground!

2)

state the thesisf

3)

state the antithesis! and

*+) state the synthesis#

Of course the pattern may vary in its

richness occasionally —

the reasoning being that if one dia

lectical progression is good, two are better.

Thus from time

to time one may be called upon to state the thesis and anti
thesis of the original thesis and antithesis.
All this is understandably confusing to the "English"
mind, whatever that is, and may require a brief explanation.
Without doubt, this singular obsession with complex order is
due as much to a demand on the part of the "French" mind for
v
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both Intellectual rigour and esthetic appeal in the presenta
tion of an idea, as it is to the fact that the academic world
in general is universally renowned for the absence of a sense
of the ridiculous.

Moreover, it is a commonly held assumption

among both academics and Frenchmen that effective thought
{not to say thesis-writing) consists in the art of imposing a
credible order on ordinary reality, thereby eliciting some
perception of an order in reality.

These are things one learns

to live with.
But what has all this to do with a preface to a thesis
ostensibly concerned with political science?
very well ask.

The reader may

It is clear even to the author that the con

nection between the following presentation of the political
thought of Reinhold Niebuhr and the folkways of an entire na
tion, not to mention those of a minority group, are tenuous at
best.

Yet what other purpose can a preface serve than that it

prepare the reader for what is to follow?

Thus the reader is

hereby advised that the author received his undergraduate
training at the hands of a group of emigre French scholars|
that their handiwork has only too well borne fruit5 that the
above-outlined scheme has been assiduously followed in the
body of this thesis 5 and that a synthesis has been wrought be
tween an undergraduate thesis written in

(in, to, and

about the French genius) and a master’s thesis written in 1966.
This is surely the first instance on record of a synthesis of
two theses.

vl
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CHAPTER I
POLITICAL IDEALISM fS POLITICAL REALISM
The reasonable man adapts himself to the
world* the unreasonable one persists in trying
to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all
progress depends on the unreasonable man.
SHAW, Maxima for. Revolutionists. page 233.
Classification is the refuge of the sluggish mind.
It is a pedagogic device that has only one end in mind - that
of the facilitation of learning through simplification, which
In turn means the pursuit of essentials and the discarding of
the superfluous.

This of course necessitates choice*

All

rational thought Inherently involves this process of systema
tization, and Indeed for that thought to be communicable to
others in terms of logic, it must do so.

Both student and

teacher are forced to search for Order in a Universe which
will remain unmoved by any human attempts to subject it to
such a restriction.
The most readily comprehensible classification is that
of the simple thesis and antithesis.

Grouping all phenomena

with reference to their opposites, positive and negative, is
the ultimate in Intellectual neatness and has found no more
Inspired a champion than the American philosopher William James.
1
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As S.H. Carr observes,1 beside such a system of paired oppo
sites as Rationalist-Empirlcist, Intellectual!st-Sensationalist, Idealist-Materialist, Qptimist-Pessimist, ReligiousIrreligious, Monist-Pluralist, Voluntarist-Fatalist, and Dogmatist-Sceptic, even Hegel's triadic dialectic must appear
heavily encumbered and awkward.

Moreover, apart from mundane

considerations of comprehensibility, the esthetic appeal of
such pure artistic form cannot be gainsaid.

It is unfortunate

that while two points do make a straight line (or a comparison),
it however takes a third point to give it meaning*
Having thus made all the proper academic reservations
pertaining to the artificial and subjective nature of "classi
fication" par se, it is now permissible to proceed directly to
the purpose of this introductory chapter, which is: to define
that basic distinction between Realism and Idealism which in
forms all differing political systems, and in the process, to
ascertain in vhat way this distinction diverges, if indeed it
does, from others offered to a similar end.
Such traditional constrasts as democratic vs. aristo
cratic, individualistic vs. oollectlvistic, or liberal vs.
conservative are by now quit© familiar if for no other reason
than that each in a modified but recognisable form, has en
joyed its brief moment on the stage of history.

At such pe

riods each theory reflected the power ambitions of particular
social groupings or classes and each articulated a specific
*42.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis. New York, 196^-,
p .1 2 .
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3
concept of the nature of man and his relations to the community.
And in turn each claimed to Justify itself in terms of such
equally vague concepts as MJustice*', "liberty", "equality", "or
der", "good government" or "pursuit of happiness".
Whether one attempts to distinguish between political
theories on the basis of these aforementioned ultimata Justi
fications, or for instance, merely on one particular aspect
of the "exercise of authority", will depend In the final anal
ysis on the degree to which the observer wishes to be 'purely'
or 'exclusively* political.

If politics is the "master science"

it is because the study of a political system may take one of
many divers# courses suitable to the respective talents of the
philosopher and the economist, or the theologian and the soci
ologist, and still b® legitimately considered a political study.
It is possible, however, to be uniquely political In a narrower
sense by confining the examination to the exercise of power,
the consideration of which belongs less properly to any other
field.

By using such a narrow criterion, it is thus possible

to distinguish between political theories on a 'purely' po
litical ground, but there is no Inherent reason why using such
an 'exclusively' political criterion should be preferable to
any other.
Just as no single view of distinguishing and classi
fying political systems can be considered superior to all
others by virtue of its "political-ness", so no on® criterion
can be held to fill the role of "all-inclusive distinction"
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better than all others.
strongly.

This warning cannot be emphasized too

While most antithetical categories may be of great

use in examining many theories of politics from a particular
point of view, it must be seriously questioned whether these
same distinctions can be anything more than equally artificial
and arbitrary when applied to the whole of political thought.
It will be seen that exactly how useful any given scheme is,
depends on one's purposes.

Hopefully this criterion of con

scious aim will be applied to the one upon which this thesis
is built.
Taken as a whole, no political theory can be said to
be "true".

It contains among its component parts certain

Judgments of fact, estimates of probability, concepts of the
'good1, the 'real', the 'rational', and ways of knowing them.
While these elements, in combination, may be Judged "logically
consistent" in their mutual interrelation and while they may
be deemed to provide "useful insights" into political phenom
ena, invariably they Include evaluations and preferences which
will distort the perception of fact, will shape the estimates
of probability, and will determine the aforementioned concepts
Similarly, there exist no independent criteria for demonstra
ting that any political theory is "false", either in its whole
or in its parts.

Despite this, there exists a distinction

between fact and value whieh theoretically stands to be ap
plied to all thought.

It is precisely when this application

is attempted, that the relationship between the two becomes
less clearly defined than the contrast in theory would make
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5
it appear.

It Is not that the meaning of the two concepts is

ambiguous in their mutual tension, but simply that any asser
tion involving their use begs a prior question of the nature
of reality and knowledge.
Positing then In theory, two worlds —

the empirical

world of fact and the ideal world of 'rational* value —

the

basic question concerns the relationship between the two.

Any

statement on this relationship betrays a prior ontologieal
and eplstemological commitment whether it is claimed that in
'reality' the distinction ceases to exist or otherwise.

No

political theorist can escape the responsibility of making a
judgment explicitly or Implicitly on this relationship, al
though admittedly a mere statistician of contemporary political
behaviour may limit the extent of such judgments to fundamental
methodology.

This fact alone suggests that It is possible to

make an extended classification of all political systems in
terms of these judgments.
Apart from whether it is or is not possible to make
such a distinction, the overriding concern must involve the
value of doing so.

It would not be difficult to devise any

number of dividing lines whose sole merit would consist in the
fact that they cover the entire length of political thought,
were it not necessary to demonstrate as well that the result
is fruitful in terms of academic inquiry.

While grouping all

political theorists according to whether they reasoned induc
tively or deductively might have relevance to an historic de
bate over conceptual framework, sine® no consistent relation

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ship can fee established between 'method' and any other uni
versal criterion, the research would ultimately be found to
be sterile.

For example, Plato, Rousseau, and Hobbes used a

deductive method In constructing their theories while Aristotle ‘
and Machiavelli employed inductive procedures and John Stuart
Mill combined both.

It is thus necessary to demonstrate that

any distinction in general, and in particular, the one herein
presented which is based on differing concepts of the rela
tionship In history between the empirical world and the ra
tional ideal, reveals fundamental antagonisms which may never
be resolved, and explains predispositions in issues of the
highest importance.2

The extent to which these requirements

are met may be better judged when the criteria are explained
in detail.
Derived from this original distinction between fact
and value, this "dividing-line" to be herein presented, may
be summed up in differing concepts of the "possible".
two broad schools of thought emerge.

Herein

The labels which will be

used for these schools are .Realism and Idealism, although the
reader is advised that the meanings which will be assigned to
2 l’
he word 1predispositions' is used her© for want of
any better objective term. Admittedly one could go overboard
in this objectivity in the manner of Bertrand Russell who is
reported as saying during the last war, that he personally had
no quarrel with Hitler's philosophy although he objected to it
on purely esthetic grounds* The 'issues of the highest im
portance' refers not to debates over which type of government
produces what type of system, but to such arguments over hier
archies of values such as whether Order or Freedom or Justice
should be the conscious end of political action*
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these words may not conform

fully to accepted usage, nor nec

essarily to that of Niebuhr

himself.

Fundamental as this is maintained to be, it is by no
means, a simple task to define accurately and yet concisely
exactly what is meant by these terms.

Although philosophical

and theological definitions

abound, it is clear thatto make

use of them would make this

a thesis on metaphysics.

To the

knowledge of the author, a political definition qua definition
has not existed until recently and most latter-day ’'Realists”
like Hans J. Morgenthau have been content to make extended
descriptions.3

Even the usually-reliable political diction

aries seem unwilling to do more than list common usages, ob
serve that these should not be confused with the metaphysical
meanings they might otherwise have, and suggest referring to
the collected works of a few individuals who consider them
selves members of one group or another.1*
However in 1951» John H. Herz attempted just such a
definition by positing the reality of what he calls the "se
curity and power" dilemma and then examining the extent to
which various theories recognise this reality.^

However by

3s@© Wat. T, Bluhra,
,,gf
PplA,tl.cj,,1..3ystem,
New York, 1965* P* 179? and Morgenthau's introduction to his
own book Polities .Among nations. New York, 1962, pp. 3-15.
**The best dictionary to appear in recent years is
Joseph Dunner's Met.ionary..J3f Political Science. (Philosophical
Library), New York, 196*+, yet even this otherwise superb volume
limits Itself to the above observations.
5John H. Herz, Political Realism and .Political. ..Idealism.
Chicago, 196*+, pp. 18-19* Herz defines Realism in the following manner* " (It) ... characterizes that type of political
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adhering to a certain position with regard to the nature of
the real world, Herz limited his definition unnecessarily and
thereby failed to find the objective criterion he sought.

The

nucleus of his definitions, on the other hand, represents a
valuable contribution to any understanding of the terms, for
it advances the novel idea that the relationship between the
empirical order as he understood it and the ideal order as
anyone might choose to paint it, was and is a key which would
Illuminate features common to seemingly dissimilar theorists.
From this argument that certain thinkers are joined by a com
mon bond and are to be distinguished from another group of
thinkers in terms of eaeh’s understanding of this relationship,
arises Harz’s conviction that the typology of political thought
and behaviour ha has presented is, in his words, ’’applicable
to events throughout known history".^

But if it is possible

to devise a criterion based on the relationship between the
empirical order, not as a Realist understands it (which is
what Herz admittedly is) but as both Realist and Idealist
might understand It, and the ideal order also as it might be
generally understood, the result might be more objective and,
it is hoped, universally valid.
thought which ... recognizes ... the implications for political
life of those security and power factors which ... are inherent
in human society.” Likewise he says* ’’Political Idealism ...
is characteristic of that type of political thinking which ...
does not recognize the problems arising from the security and
power dilemma ... .” Herz obviously has to assume the irration
al nature of human society* how does he classify the thinker
who, as unlikely as It may seem to Herz, sees no contradiction
to be resolved between the empirical and ideal orders?
6 Herz, ag.,„glt., p. v.
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9
To this end, a new definition would be phrased as
follows i
POLITICAL IDEALISM is defined as any political
theory which in its particular conception of the
nature of man, politics, and society, by effect or
by design resolves any seeming contradiction be
tween existing impulses in the empirical world
and the historical attainability of a rational
and moral order derived from universally valid
abstract principles.
A closer look at the terms of the definition of Polit
ical Idealism may facilitate the reader’s efforts to apply the
concept to individual thinkers.

Key words or phrases which

may stand in need of explication would seem to be* ’’existing
impulses”, ’’historical”, and ’’rational and moral order”: other
wise their Interaction would not seem to merit Individual at
tention*
It should be noted that the complete phrase Is:
’’ .*. resolves any seeming contradiction between existing
Impulses”. Again it must be stressed that it is not necessary
to credit any contradiction whatsoever, for to do so would
imply a certain type of preconception with regard to the em
pirical order.

This definition avoids Herz's unnecessary re

striction, although the restrletlveness involved In the latter
exists only if Herz wishes to include all political thinkers.
In practice, most political scientists have been willing to
concede at least an apparent conflict between the empirical
order and the ideal world.

Thus by ’’existing Impulses” is

meant those forces which by themselves or in combination, have
mad® the history of man read like a chronicle of the ravages
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10
of power, exploitation, inequality, wars, and other conflicts.
In short it is man’s proclivity to indulge himself at monoto
nously regular Intervals in activities associated at one time
with a "state of nature" (in a Hobbesian sense), and more
generally in a cynical age, accepted as part of the empirical
order as it is known now or at any particular time.

The drives

which inform this behaviour are referred to by several names,
most popularly, the will-to-Iive and the

often

summed up in that most eloquent of French phrases, la condition
humaine. What essentially is meant by this is that the "willto-live" and Its natural corollary, the "will-to-power", when
in combination, produce a tragic paradox.

One man’s desire to

perpetuate his existence causes him to regard everything as a
potential threat to that aim*

To Insure himself better against

the effects of such threats, he seeks after power, and his
safety is measured In terms of the power differential between
himself and others*

But if A gains power, it is by definition

an automatic threat to the "wlll-to-llv@" of B and so B must
make up that difference.
has commenced.

This spurs A on again and the spiral

This quest is at the same time self-assertive

and self-destructive.

While various imposed primitive orders

may have mitigated the circumstances under which this struggle
took place, so far in history it has not been eliminated.

One

has only to witness the sorry tale of man’s existence up to
now to testify to that.

In other words, this is man’s egotism.

Obviously the phrase "existing Impulses” should not be taken
to refer to any alleged "pity instinct", or if it Includes
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that, it should mean more properly those forces which hare
historically prevented man from giving full play to such an
instinct, whether imposed from within or necessitated from
without.

Like John Hera, one may wish to commit oneself as

to the exact nature of these impulses by using the term ’’se
curity and power dilemma”, and buttress it with illustrations
taken from any Freshman Sociology text* or one may be satis
fied to describe them more generally? but what is underlined
here and what is universally agreed upon, is their effect.
What they will be specifically depends ultimately on one's
view of the nature of man, politics, and society.
The word ’’historical” In the sans® in which it is
employed in the definition, is much more than a "time back
there concept”. It is the total duration of man's temporal
or secular existence prior to an apocalyptic denouement.
Hothing can be said about what man may or may not achieve
during this period, for that depends on one's view of the
nature of man, but as one author has suggested, it is "the
depth dimension of our p r e s e n t . W h i c h is to say that it is
past, present, and future seen in terms of all of man's limi
tations and/or freedom*

In some systems of thought, "history”

is limited to that length of time man takes to achieve per
fection, but it is a matter of much confusion whether the
exact moment of the achievement of that perfection falls on
the historical or post-historical side of the great dividing
/Gordon Harland, m M M k t
York, I960, p.91*

£g.
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12
line5 all of which again makes man’s achievements a poor cri
terion.

Thus, where the words ’’history” or ’’historical” appear

to be used in this study in a specific sense, an eschatological
criterion will be implied.

It should therefore be kept in mind

that what lies "outside history” remains beyond the competence
of man, polities, and society no matter how they are defined.
Moreover it remains beyond the competence of this thesis whose
concern is with differing concepts of the ’possible' "within
history”.
With regard to a ”rational and moral order”, there is
no attempt here to stipulate what values will inform the con
cept, how they are obtained or how they relate to that order.
It suffices to state that the order is somehow derived from
these ultimate values and that this makes it ’’moral”. However,
it must be remembered that this conceptual world is both moral
and rational.

This is necessary if only because throughout

history men have been less than satisfied with the prospect
that reason and obligation might sometimes conflict.

As such,

the use of the word ”rational” includes what is commonly under
stood by the term (the nationalist school’s belief in the
appropriateness of reason alone to all aspects of human exist
ence), but also means more than this and may therefore require
explanation.

In this case, ’’rational” refers to the fact that

the posited order has, in theory, already reconciled any con
flict between the previously mentioned egotistic Impulses of
man and the moral requirements of that order.

An easy harmony

is thereby established between that which is right and that
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which is reasonable.
Having established that the Political Idealist upholds
the proposition ’’what should be, can be” , all that remains is
to discuss various concepts which will generally attend this
attitude, or can be derived from it.

While Political Idealism

is literally any theory which holds to the attainability of a
posited order within history, more typically it takes the form
of Individualism, Humanism, liberalism, Rationalism, Pacifism,
Internationalism, and even Anarchism (included in the category
of liberalism is so-called ’’hard liberalism” or Marxism, which
is often a very confusing element in this category of Idealism for while it employs Realist analysis, it does so for Idealist
ends).

All of these schools must try to establish a connection

between the ideals they champion and the actual history of man
Q

in society,

a feat which is usually accomplished in one of

several ways.

One may put forward political ideals as goals

of political action, to be realised in a more or less distant
future through the operation of an "objective trend” or "nec
essary development" as discerned through a philosophy of his
tory (Marxism)*

Without relying on any "Inevitability", one

may attempt to demonstrate that the attainment of the political
ideals merely attends the fullest expression of those selfish
but enlightened interests which have traditionally motivated
8 'man in society' is historical man,
Thus this con
nection between Utopia and the history of man cannot be pro
vided by any reference to a Golden Age in the sens® of the
Christo-Judaic "Garden of Bden". Man 'before the Pall' Is no
less outside History than is Man 'after the Day of Judgment'.
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m m (laissez-faire),9

Or on© may at the very least demonstrate

that present and past exist in a neutral limbo, awaiting as it

were, but not advancing toward, the ideal.
To do this, the Political Idealist must promote one
of several ideas as to the nature of the already-mentioned
Mexisting Impulses”, He may assert that the "impulses" do not
exist, in which case he must devise some other explanation for
the disorder that the rest of humanity appears to find in the
empirical world#

H© may assert that the "impulses" tend to

ward a natural harmony.

He may assert that the "Impulses" are

transitory and malleable, in which case he opts for "free
will".

(The assertion that the "impulses" are part of a grand

design of objective laws is not typical of Idealism but is a
determinist argument borrowed by Marxists from the Realist
school and used out of context.)

Thus the Idealist (excluding

the Marxist)' is necessarily voluntarist.

Any failure so far

to attain the "good order" is thereby shown to be derived
from man's wickedness or stupidity or both.

Thus by an act

of will, "reality" is altered (in actual fact, rejected) and
^Th® reference here is to what might b® called "clas
sical" laissez-faire which states that an invisible hand per
mits the individual to seek his own (true) gain and at the same
time, consciously or unconsciously promote the general Interest
of society. As S.H. Carr points out (op.cit.. p.^2-3), if the
individual behaves badly, it is because he is short-sighted
and muddle-headed. Superficially, laissez-faire might be seen
as an easy identity of
and ought (thus its usefulness to
conservatives in preserving the status-quo), when it is really
on® of ought and ought on different levels of social structure.
As well, it should be pointed out that the Social Darwinist
variant of laissez-faire has more in common with the previous
example of Marxism than it has with laissez-faire as discussed
in this context, especially with regard to the determinism of
the former.
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the m y paved for an ultimate solution.
fery little time has been spent so far in dealing with
the Realist position.

As an approach to politics, it developed

as a reaction against Political Idealism and because of this,
and its generally-acknowledged "pessimistic outlook" (sometimes
erroneously called 'cynicism'), it is most often described in
terms of what Idealism is not. While this method may be at
tractive, it is not the stuff of which definitions are made,
for it is the impression of the author that unlike definition
which attempts to grasp the essence of something, description
will Involve a comparison with something else and may be im
plied in terms of an antithesis*

Accordingly, a positive

statement (definition) of the concept of Realism is as follows*
POLITICAL REALISM is defined as any political
theory which postulates historic and existing im
pulses in the nature of man* politics, and society
as fixed and immutable realities which determine
the basic and enduring irrationality of historical
political existence.
While the remarks preceding the above definition were
addressed specifically to the concept of Political Idealism,
it should require little mental effort on the part of the
reader to extend them to the definition of Political Realism.
Disregarding the addition of the word "historic" (in its com
monly understood usage) to the phrase "existing impulses",

the phrase "fixed and Immutable realities" (which should be
self-explanatory), and the antonym "irrationality", the phra
seology is similar to that of the former definition.

Never

theless, so that the category may be completely understood, a
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few general remarks will be addressed to the Implications of
the position*

Realism recognises the effects of a basic ir

rationality which Is assumed to govern political life, and
bases its theories and observations upon the phenomena of
Existing impulses” as understood by them.

Thus the Realist

must emphasise the irresistible strength of these impulses
in a pre-determined existence which he is powerless to change.
He thinks in terms of causality in statings ’’what is, must be
the limit of what can be”. He also regards those same values
which the Idealists proclaim, as being derived from this ir
rational political existence| the implication of which is that
ethics is a tool of polities.

However any attempt to glorify

the ’Is1 as an ’ought to be' lies beyond the capacity of the
Realist qua Realist and while there is an observable tendency
toward this, it is not intrinsic to the school.

Generally

the Realist has no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that
any Idealist proposition is not ’fact’ but ’aspiration', and
will go on to demonstrate that far from being a priori prop
ositions, they are completely rooted by cause and effect in
the world of ’reality’.
No attempt will be made at this time to chronicle the
charges that each side levels at the other, or to suggest
weaknesses in each position.

These may or may not be evident,

but this is not Important, for these implications of the op
position between Idealism and Realism will develop slowly
from a more detailed study of their applicability to the
political thought of Relnhold Niebuhr.
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These then are the major statements of each concept.
Ever 7 political theorist must at any particular point in his
system opt for one school or the other, for it is not possible
to. embrace all the elements of both in one consistent theme.
Nevertheless there are writers who for one reason or another,
have attempted to incorporate in their work elements of theory
which upon closer inspection are revealed to have been derived
from the opposite school to which one would normally assign
the writer.

In Aristotle's Politics. Books I - III, VII, and

VIII belong to the Idealist school while Books IV, V, and VI
were more concerned with empirical investigation .10

The di

vine history and the profane history in Augustine's Citv of
God are outlined in parallel, but are never fused.

Marx has

already been mentioned in this context as what Bluhm calls a
"brldgebullder".

That man such as the aforementioned should

prove the exception rather than the rule, will become clearer
as the features of each concept are applied to Relnhold
Niebuhr.

However, the fact that few writers stand in both

camps to any significant degree, should not be taken to mean
that most authors are unwilling to make use of opportunities
for reconciling opposing theories.

This often makes for con

fusion in analysis.
It will be recalled that mention has been made of
certain requirements which must be met in order that this
classification might be considered meaningful.

The remainder

l°Georg@ H. Sabine, A...History of Political Theory.
New York, 1961, pp. 98-105.
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of tills chapter will be devoted to a discussion of this aspect.
The antithesis of utonla and reality, or so it might
be termed, is perhaps the commonest phenomenon in all of pol
itics.

Every citizen, if he has any political consciousness

at all, is at least dimly aware of the frustration caused by
a comparison of what is and what might be.

Nowhere is this

more vividly shown than in the field of international politics
which is particularly susceptible to outbursts of wishful
thinking disguised as ultimata solutions.

How many times has

the wish been expressed that if only common, hard-working,
blunt-talking folk on both sides of the Iron Curtain were to
sit around the conference table instead of all those diplomats,
how soon everything would be cleared up I By merely substitu
ting nouns and adjectives in that sentence, it could serve as
an all-purpose form whose blanks could be filled according
to the situation, and made to apply to political problems in
every century since man emerged from caves.

This attitude

has by no means been limited to the political masses.

In his

column in the Toronto Slobe and Mall of Wednesday, February
16th, 1966, Richard J. Needham quotes ex-President of the
United States, Harry Truman in the following manners
"It all seems to have been in vain.

Memories

&r© short, and app«t±t®» for power and glory

are insatiable. Old tyrants depart. New ones
take their places. Old differences are composed,
new differences arise? old allies become the
foe, the recent enemy becomes the friend. It
is all very baffling and trying."H
11 Richard

Needham, The M stiO t

Feb. 16, 1966,
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Mr* Truman here speaks with the disillusionment and cynicism,
not of the Realist, but of the frustrated Idealist or as Need
ham calls it, the Dawnist* "Bawnism", Needham describes as,
"the idea that by some wondrous method

you can set up a

brave new world in which all are happy and healthy and harmo
nious, where the lion lies down with the lamb ...

Unfor

tunately the columnist feels that this is characteristically
American, but while it cannot be doubted that the American
nation has suffered from this to a greater extent than have
her more sophisticated counterparts in old Europe, it is to
be seriously questioned whether It is a point of view limited
solely to the New World.

Marx after all was a German, Lenin

was a Russian, and the League of Nations dream-world was never
joined by the Americans.
All men when they think politically, long for a better
order —

for all men, when they think politically, think with

a purpose.

Thus all political thought in its inception has

an expressed desire to move from the present tense to the
future tense in the form of an "if, then" sequence.

It Is

obvious however, that any statement on what the future may
hold depends entirely on one's understanding of the present,
which in turn is a function of knowledge of the past.

Com

monly, attributing 'utopianism* to a political idea Indicates
one's basic disagreement with the particular view of the fu
ture that the idea advances, while attributing 'realism* in
dicates approbation.

More than this, each is a comment on

the Idea's implied concept of the present and the past and
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the relationship between them*
It can be argued that the present is no more knowable*
than the past or the future.

Yet even in the absence of such

knowledge, terms such as ‘utopian* and ’realistic’ are con
tinually used, quite often without much meaning or content.
It has been the primary task of this first chapter to ground
these concepts in a theoretical base divorced from a prior
commitment as to what reality is.

Thus this theoretical base

consists of differing concepts, not of the empirical world
and the rational ideal, but of the relationship in history
between the two, whatever they may be.
This then is the purpose of the distinction between
Realism and Idealism —

to provide an objective and universal

means of grouping all political systems, in the light of which
the scheme’s efficacy and fruitfulness must be judged.

In

other words, If all political thought asks three great ques
tions* ’’what is desirable?”, “what is possible?” and “how can
it best be attained?”, a fundamental division in terms of the
answers given to any of these questions will be meaningful to
academic Inquiry.

The selection in this instance, of the

second question —

“what is possible?”, should not be seen to

imply that this is more important than the first* quite ob
viously any complete political system must answer both.

It

is simply that the “Reallsm-Idealism” dichotomy Inherent in
the second question but not In the first (or third, for that
matter), permits an examination of all political thought with
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out prejudgment of either the metaphysical underpinnings of
each system or Its rationality.

Moreover, it is only within

recent years that the ’’utopian-realist” contrast has been used
as a basis for analysis, although for the large part there has
been no contrast involved (for years men have, as in the battle
of the sexes, agreed to admit the difference but have never
defined it), but simply an examination of Utopians or Realists
within their respective schools.

Accordingly, this chapter

may be seen as an attempt to remedy a situation in which an
entire aspect of political analysis has been overlooked.
Finally, there are two very practical considerations
to which this classification must answer.

It would be most

amusing, not to say disheartening, to go to the trouble of
idealizing two basic types, only to find that nearly all po
litical theorists belong to one and but an insignificant mi
nority to the other, or, what is worse, that everyone falls
more or less near the middle.

The reader may reassure himself

on this scores there are substantial numbers on both sides of
the great divide and only a tiny minority have feet in both
l2Studies such ass George Kateb, Utopia and Its Enemies.
Mew York, 1963; U.M. Shklar, After Utopia. Princeton. 1957s
G. Negly and J.M. Patrick,
. S l M t . . . N e w York, 1952;
B.P. Skinner,
New York, 19^8; Karl Popper. 149,-QP.aa
aaaigfcLJB&JUgJfelfalgH» Princeton, 1950* and Barrington Moore,
E f i X l t l c j g X f f l t t P J Q r . i Cambridge, 1958; concern
themselves solely with one school or the other and as such are
never bothered with the problem of definition. The reader is
vaguely aware of the fact that both he and the respective au
thors may share some notion of what these groups are, and this
presumably takes the place of definition. Contrast this with
Herz’s
which consti
tutes the sol® effort to consider both schools at the same
time over the broad range of political thought.
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camps.

This

1$

necessarily so, because of the antithetical

character of the distinction, and it may be seriously argued
that even this minority has substituted pretension for logic,
or as others claim, theology for political science.
Obviously, the second question in the mind of the
reader must concern the applicability of the categorization
herein evolved, to the political thought of Reinhold Niebuhr.
It is significant that it will be shown throughout the remain
der of the thesis that he belongs to that minority which com
bines elements of both schools, as the title of this study
would indicate.

It is hoped that the great significance of

his contribution to political thought in general and inter
national relations in particular, will be underscored or even
highlighted by viewing Niebuhr from the vantage point of an
awareness of the differences between the Realist school and
the Idealist school*

Like Marx, he takes elements from both:

unlike Marx, in the end he transcends both.
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CHAPTER II

THE ROOTS OF NIEBUHR'S POLITICAL THOUGHT
Les deux sujets ©nt grandi concurrement
dans mon ©sprit, 1 'excds de l'un trouvant dans
I'excis de 1 'autre une permission secrete et
tous deux s@ maintenant en equilibre.
ANDRE GIDE, Journal, page 365•
The difficulty of placing Reinhold Niebuhr in any neat
category confronts his students and critics alike, at all levels
of discussion.

No attempt to capture the genius of the man

either at a point in time or in a field of endeavour can pos
sibly succeed, and certainly no effort to superimpose upon his
life's work a rigid systematic framework will ever bear fruit.
It is at once an admission of the dynamism of his thought and
a testament to the diversity of his interests that Niebuhr can
only be likened to Stephen Leacock's Lord Ronald who flung him
self upon his horse and rode madly off in all directions.
McCall's refers to Niebuhr as America's leading Prot
estant theologian.

Halter Lippman and Hans Morgenthau con

sider him a practical political strategist and a theoretical
Interpreter of politics.2

Nathan Scott himself calls Niebuhr

^•McCall*s. John Cogley, "An Interview with Relnhold
Niebuhr", February 1966, page 90.
2Nathan A. Scott, Relnhold Niebuhr. Minneapolis, 1963,
p.8 j see also Hans Morgenthau's article in Relnhold Niebuhr?
A Prophetic Voice in OurTime. Greenwich, 1962.
23
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a theological anthropologist.3 Charles Fraokel sees him as a
philosopher of history*1* will Horberg describes Niebuhr as
the leading spokesman of Conservatism.5 C.f* Crabb regards
hi* as the primary critic of the Baalist school

while 'Hobart

Osgood, on the other hand, calls Niebuhr a primary critic of
tli# Idealist school.? Paul Ramsey considers hi* above all a
moralist.9

It will b@ noted that all thus® references hav#

b##n culltd from discussions of Niebuhr written within th#
last six years.

If os# war# to take in a span of fifty years,

os# would sat that ha has also b##n considered at various times
a pacifist, socialist, Marxist, liberal, and adherent of the
Social Gospel, to mention just a few of his titles.

The final

word perhaps comes from William Bluha who sees Niebuhr as "at
once a theologian, metaphysician, ©pistemolagist, moral philos
opher, psychologist, and student of politics".9
All these labels relate to Niebuhr*s direction of
thought and/or vocation#

And all are in a sense correct, yet

non© speaks the whole truth.
^Nathan Scott,

«?©r# one to take as a basis any
P*9.

Charles Frankel, XMSMM,,j£ULM9Mm.„Hm» Boston, 1962.
"Relnhold Niebuhri
• P*379#

Burkean i

* 60iff cpS $ l Aasriiau^gagalga. Policyin the Nuclear Age.

Bvaaston, 111., I960.

7r *». Osgood,
,
I s M m & f Chicago, 1961, pp.381-3.
Bmlm,
% aul lamsey,
N.J., 1962.#

9Bluhm,

Inglewood Cliffs,

P.6B.
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of his shifting tactical positions, th® confusion would be
multiplied.

In the span of his life he has been violently for

and against Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Church
ill, the New Deal, American participation in the Second World'
lo
War and Keynesian fiscal policy.
On these points the contra
diction has been real$ on a good many others it has only existed
in th® minds of his, at times, bewildered audience.

Both John

H. Yoder and Ball Brunner admit that most people consign Nie
buhr to th® ranks of "Hao-Orthodoxy" with all that that means,
and both proceed to argue that this is a rais-nomer derived
from public confusion, not as to what "Neo-Orthodoxy” stands
for, but what Niebuhr says.

11

Unacquainted with Niebuhr’s

rather original use of terms such as "cynicism”, "idealism",
and "original sin”, popular understanding of the subtleties of
his argument is, on occasion, minimal.

Robert C. Good under

states the case if anything, when he says euphemistically:

"It

should be held In mind that Niebuhr is not a definitional writ
er. ”1^
The background to this apparent Inconsistency may be
seen In th® fact that Niebuhr’s life neatly divides into five
10Sea Arthur Schl©singer Jr., "Reinhold Niebuhr’s Role
in American Political Thought and Lire", in Kagley and Bretall,

plaMLd^N.i.$buhrs JffiUJtolUlflat, social. m dffpiU tical Thought,
Toronto, 1956.

lxJ.H. Yoder, EelhhoM Niebuhr and Christian Pacifism.
New York, 1961, p.H-f and Emil Brunner’s article In Kegley and
Bretall, op.cit.. pp.2 8 -3 3 .
12r .c . Good's thesis, The Contribution of .ReinholdJLle?ale University,
1 9 5 6 , p .8 (microfilm).
, *, rv^
1“
-v-O7 /4

feuM

UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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periods* conforming with five separate stages of the develop
ment of his political and religious thought.*3

The point is

that the commentator is at a loss to state categorically what
Niebuhr’s thought is,

What inspired him in 1926, he refuted

in 1935, and then proceeded to synthesise in 1952.

To the

best of the author’s knowledge, this process is continuing
presently.

Thus the present task of discussing Niebuhr’s thought

Is not unlike attempting to capture the fleeting images of a
kaleidoscope by engraving them on a wood-cut.

The rapidity

with which each succeeding impression resolves into a different
yet related pattern, is matched by the painful sluggishness and
immobility of the portraying medium.
Finally, it is patently obvious that Niebuhr simply
will not conform to any one pre-ordained categorization based
on a theoretical structure.

True to his early schooling in

Marxist methodology, his thought proceeds in crab-like dialec
tic fashion from one position to its opposite, and then com
bines and transcends both.

4s Scott observesi "It (his thought)

has always been hammered out in the process of his responding
to whatever presented Itself as problematic in the social and
political environment of his time.”1-1* Niebuhr is at once th©
iconoclast and the polemicist.

Words such as ’’dialogue", "dy

namic", "tension", and "possibilities" repeat themselves con
sistently, and show him to be ill at ease in any extreme posi^ i bid.» p.l, (Table of Contents).
l5+Nathan 4. Scott, on.cit., p.9.
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tion for long.

Some authors art tempted to suggest that Niebuhr

stands in the tradition of Plato, St. Augustin® and Burke —
more in their capacities as individuals — - (Bluhm is one who
suggests this), but on® cannot help noticing an accompanying
wariness of extending these comparisons too far.

If there is

any consensus among Niebuhr's reviewers it must lie primarily
in this facts that her© is a dynamic creative thinker not to b®
contained by any ready-made analogies.

Admittedly he is a

Christian? more specifically he is an apologist for th© "genius”
of th® Hebralc-Christian tradition, as he calls it.
has on® revealed after saying this?

Yet what

Most of Western thought

has derived its ultimate values from this source and the Chris
tian Church has an exceedingly large roof.

Billy Graham and

Rudolph Bultmann have at least two things In common* both are
Christians and neither cares much for Niebuhr's Christology.
Thus in the end, th© only label that can be applied proves too
broad to be of any us®.
Niebuhr himself is of little help in the search for a
title to pin on him, not least because, while he is fond of
using labels to spot the flaws in the arguments of his opponents,
he objects to their use in his case.

Many times he has stated

that he is only a political scientist by "avocation”. In his
opening remarks to the Kegley and Bretall study, he says* "I
cannot and do not claim to be a theologian.

I have never been

vary competent in the nice points of pure t h e o l o g y . W h a t e v e r
■^Kegley and Bretall, op.cit., p.3*
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It is that he feels competent to do, he is not about to disclose
it.

Nor is he prepared to apply a political label to himself —

perhaps wisely, for while h® regards himself as a 'liberal*,
he reserves the right to coin his own meaning for the word ...
which turns out to be a hybrid combination of a Burkean consarvative with a liberal conscience, although not quite.

He

admits to being a Christian, although he implies a qualifica
tion when he states* "When religions claim to be absolute be
cause they have a revelation from God, I'm as skeptical as the
village atheist.'1^'7 As Samuel Johnson might have said, Dr. *
Niebuhr is a very unclubable man.
Notwithstanding the difficulties which have been out
lined above, some Justification must be offered for discussing
Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr in the context which has been suggested by
the title of this thesis.

This Justification, i.e., that Nie

buhr has a particular field of endeavour which can be related
to the topic under discussion? that it is indeed possible to
distinguish between his mature thought and the confusing strains
which led up to it? and that there exists a framework into
which his thought can be fitted, —

rests on the following

three assertions* 1) that Niebuhr's vocation is Applied Theol
ogy and therefor® as much Political Science as anything else?
2)

that what he has written since
^MeCall's,

1936

constitutes his finely-

p.166.

17IMA* i p.171.
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honed political thought; and 3) that Niebuhr is, for want of a
better term, a Realist-Idealist.

These assertions will be dis

cussed as listed.
For Reinhold Niebuhr, theology and politics are not
separate fields but merely two perspectives of a single reality.
That he could hold this opinion In contradistinction to that
of many of his fellow academics, would seem to indicate a dif
ference in orientation to theology similar to that which exists
in the sciences between Physics and Engineering,

Far from being

th© cloistered systematic theologian so often produced by Euro
pean divinity schools, Niebuhr has deliberately set out, as
Paul Lehmann puts it, "to overcome the estrangement of the
modern mind from th® insights and content of the Christian
18
faith".
Niebuhr is enough of a theologian to attempt to
demonstrate the truth of the Christian faith, but at the same
time, he is enough of a pragmatist to attempt to demonstrate
its relevance as well. It is this admixture which justifies
the term "Applied Theology".

In theory, this vocation (that

is, Applied Theology) should involve him in politics as much
as in theology.

In practice, it has.

As Robert Good notes in both his doctoral thesis and
in his book, six (sic) of Niebuhr’s eighteen (sic) books have
dealt primarily with political problems and none has ignored
the political field e n t i r e l y . T h e same observation applies
iSKegley and Bretall, QP.clt.. p.253.
^Bibliographical details can be obtained in Robert
Good’s thesis, oo.oit.. pp.I-1*, and In Robert C. Good and H.R,
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to liis more than 1500 articles which have produced a torrent
of comment on current events.

He has produced major studies

In International Relations In such journals as the American
iMlfilaSf the ilrglmu .Quarterly Review« Foreign.Affairs. the
tia£]A.Jto&X£L8Mt and International Organization.
His writings for the classroom Include contributions to th®
following volumes* Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson
(ads.), .Principles and Problems of ..International. Politics. Hew
York, 1952; William Sbansteln, (ed.), Man.and..the State* Modern
.Political. Ideas« lew York, 1957; Karl De Schweinitz and Kenneth
Thompson (eds.), Man and .Modern Society. Hew York, 1953; and
Frederick H. Hartmann (ed.), Readings in International Rela
tions . New York, 1952.

He is, at the moment of writing, editor

of the bi-monthly Christianity and Crisis, and has contributed
frequently to th® .Hattonal Review. Atlantic Monthly, the Ration.
the M m J m M Z f the

and ila££££l£> to name just a

few.
Davis, Beinhold Niebuhr On Politics. Hew York, I960 (a volume
of comment and source material).Nathan A. Scott, op.cit.. also
provides a list of Niebuhr's accomplishments on paged. With
respect however to Good's figures of six and eighteen respec
tively, nowhere is it clear which six he means, and the figure
eighteen obviously does not include what one must presume to be
Niebuhr's final work on politics, MpktJ.
fihMttr,
nltifl.3. (1965). In addition to the latter, there would seem to
be seven works exclusively devoted to polities as opposed to a
philosophy of history or theology, to wit* Moraj Mm.ftM
amMftflA&faC (1933)! ChrJj?M_anity and Power Politics (19H0);
ShildrenTof Light, and the Children of Darkness ( 1 9 W * Jhe
(1952); Chr.ls.tlan Realism and Polltla L Il.a M .ia i (1953); E.lom„aM
(1958); and
atmc.tur.8.of....Nations and. lamtmg. (19597. All were published in
New York City*
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If this war© not enough to qualify him as a political
scientist, there are as well, many examples of his active in
terest in politics.

In his early years, he often ran for pub

lic office as a Socialist and has held positions of leadership
in such groups as United for Democratic Action, the Liberal
Party of Mew York, th# American Association for Democratic
Germany, and the Resettlement Campaign for Exiled Professionals.
In th© fall of 19*4-6 he was a member of a State Department mis
sion to Germany and was appointed in 19*+9 as an official rep
resentative to the fourth session of the General Conference of
UNESCO.

H© has since frequently served as an informal consult

ant to members of the policy planning staff of the State Depart
ment and is at present a Research Associate at Columbia Univer
sity’s Institute for War and Peace Studies.

It is a wonder

that he has found time to be a theologian.
Every student of Niebuhr’s thought, whether it be in
politics, philosophy, or theology, has at on© time or another
had to grapple with the problem of what may properly be con
sidered to b® that ’thought'.

His political writings, though

extensive, have never been systematic.

In a sense, he has had

th© annoying habit of thinking out loud for fifty years —

a

practice which, although provocative and thoroughly honest, al
lows for the existence in published form, of ideas and opinions
long-since abandoned, outgrown, and repudiated by their own au
thor.

Moreover, while he has written his magnum onus in the

ology (The Nature andDestiny of Man), much of his political
thought lies scattered carelessly throughout his near score of
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books and countless occasional articles long out of print, the
implications of which have only been brought out in his last
book.

Were this thesis to be a treatment of the evolution of

Niebuhr’s thought, there would be little problem.

However,

since the Intention is to discuss his mature philosophy of pol
itics, it is first necessary to look for a watershed.
Anyone at all acquainted with Niebuhr’s life is at
least dimly aware of the fact that Niebuhr went through two
very difficult periods in the evolution of his thought.

In the

Introduction to Robert Good’s thesis already mentioned, these
periods are labelled according to the prevailing philosophy
Niebuhr espoused* in the first case, Idealism and its resultant
disillusionment (1913-1927)* and in the second, Realism (1 9 2 8 1 9 3 5 ).

thus the year

1936

Is a seminal year for many reasons.

That year saw the beginning of his attempts to structure a syn
thesis of the two violent periods he had just gone through.

It

was in that year that he began to be reconciled to the New Deal.
It was In that year that he published his book Bevond Tragedy,
in many respects itself a seminal book.

1936

was the year he

began to be worried about a re-emerging Germany and the conse
quences of this for the TJnlted States.

Thereafter, Niebuhr

seemed content with the basic framework of his thought —

based

not on a fixed and closed system, but on th® absence of one —
and what has followed has been a series of variations on that
them®.

Consequently, the basis of discussion in this thesis

must be understood to be Niebuhr’s thought as it has been pre
sented since

1936,

although for illustration or clarification,
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reference may be made from time to time to attitudes held prior
to that date.
However, the contention that it is indeed possible to
grasp Niebuhr’s mature thought rests on even more solid ground
than this.

Unlike previous efforts to discuss Niebuhr’s po

litical thought, this present thesis has enjoyed a fortuitous
advantage in that its composition has coincided with the ap
pearance of what Is advertised as Niebuhr's final book on pol
itics.

Man’s Mature and H-ls Communities may in fact be consid

ered to be th© nearest thing to a magnum onus on politics in
this case, for it would have been possible to write this entire
thesis on the basis of that work alone.

Bvery previously woven

strand in Niebuhr’s political fabric is presented and refined
thereinj unfortunately however, the author seems after forty or
so years to have grown tired of giving those detailed explana
tions and directions without which it is almost impossible for
the reader to follow the convoluted reasoning.

Thus a tacit

assumption that the reader has already read his preceding works
seems to pervade the book.
As previously stated, the subject matter of this study
rests on three basic premises.

Th® first two have already been

dealt with in the space of one or two pages each, but the third
will require considerably more detailed treatment, for obvious
reasons.

The question of a suitable framework or category for

Niebuhr’s thought is in essence, another way of phrasing the
title of this thesis, and as such will constitute the remainder
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of th# body of this examination.
It is pointless to attempt to fathom the source of the
dichotomy which informs all of Relnhold Niebuhr*s thought in
general, or in this case, the roots of his political thought,
without first grounding the discussion in some understanding
of the formative years in Niebuhr’s life when this thought was
developing.

Th© disposition to encompass two conflicting

streams of thought —

Realism and Idealism —

In one explana

tion of man, politics, and society, obviously did not arise out
of a vacuum.

Nor did the ability to appreciate elements in both

merely reflect an acquired academic ambivalence designed to pass
for objectivity.

In th© ease of th© former, the desire to find

a synthesis was a legacy handed from father to son*, in the lat
ter, the attractions of Baalism and Idealism were a product of
Niebuhr’s own contact with the world around him.
In his *'Intellectual Biography” prefacing th© Kegloy
and Bretall study, Niebuhr begins by acknowledging one of the
greatest Influences in his life, that of his father, Rev. Gustav
Niebuhr.

Unfortunately, non® of Niebuhr's reviewers have devoted

much time or effort to examining this particular aspect of his
development to assess its effects upon his thought, and only
June Bingham has described this segment of his life in any de
tail .20

That one family could produce two of America's leading

theologians —

Reinhold and his brother Helmut Richard —

would

seem to denote more than coincidence, or more positively, point
20June Bingham, figam g&Jffl,,jjfanagftiL New York, 1961,
pp. if9-65.
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to an environmental factor in the person of the father.

One

might even be tempted to argue “heredity0 were that not some
what out of style.

Nevertheless, it is surprising that this

factor should be so generally ignored.
Gustav Niebuhr, an amateur historian and theologian in
his own right, in the words of his son Reinhold* M ... intro
duced his sons and daughter to the thought of (Adolf) Hamack
without fully sharing the liberal convictions of that theolo
gian."21

Neither was he about to forget the German conservative

reactionism on the other hand, from which he had fled.

Gustav

saw the difficulties inherent in the total view of both atti
tudes and as was usual with him, embarked on an independent mid
dle road, using as the only guide, Macaulay's epigram that
’nothing is so useless a® a general maxim'.
ivory-tower academician.

Moreover he was no

He constantly attempted to bring his

thought into focus with reality by being engaged in community
work and as far as the local German-immigrant farmers were con
cerned, “spent a good deal of time trying to beguile them from
their rather unconstructlve conservatism."22

The image of his

father continued to inspire Relnhold throughout his life for,
unlike many of his contemporaries of a later age, and like his
father, he sought to discover the relevance of the Faith to
history| and near the end of a long career, he could look back
and say, "I'm glad Insofar as I have adequately exploited the
21Kegley and Bretall, op.eit.. p.3.
22June Bingham,

P*59.
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vision of ay father.”23

This vision involved discerning the

point at which the Faith and history, the City of God and the
City of Man impinged upon each other.

The vision was a syn

thesis derived from th© tension between the two, but it awaited
a fuller exposition than the father could ever give it.

This

was th® son’s task.
If the mature thought of the elder Niebuhr gave th®
young man th© tools with which he was ultimately to work, that
is, "synthesis” and "paradox”, it could not provide him with
th© subjects upon which he had to work.

These were a function

of his external environment and his response to it.

According

ly, the dichotomy (thesis and antithesis) to b® resolved may
be seen in th© successive Idealistic and Realistic phases which
marked his first forty years and which developed out of Nie
buhr* s contact with American society of th© early Twentieth
Century, in Its intellectual climate and economic conditions.
It is understandable that his first phase was Idealist.
Relnhold Niebuhr grew up in the America of the turn of
the Century —

th© America which was in the midst of an extended

period of prosperity and expansion, and which, remaining aloof
from foreign entanglements, was left to pursue its Manifest
Destiny as it saw fit.

As H.-C. Rohrbach states?

It was a proud age, filled with the conviction
that democracy made men good, and that those new
sciences — psychology and sociology — would
overcome man’s evil Inclinations, once so dan23MCcall’s, op^cife., p.1 7 1 .
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gerous, much as the machine had yoked the
mountains and spanned th® vastness of a
continent. Sod remained of interest only
as someone who had presumably arranged every
thing so well that America had come to be
'God's Country'.
2*+
This was American liberalism —

a rising optimism about man,

derived from this new mystique of democracy, from the new op
portunity of those prosperous times, from a new humanism, and
not least, from a romantic faith in the Innocence and selfreliance of the 'chosen' country —

America.

Niebuhr later

(how much later and why, will become clearer afterwards) reduced
this liberal climate to a set of propositions*
a. That injustice is caused by ignorance and will
yield to education and greater Intelligence.
b. That civilisation is becoming gradually more
moral and that it is a sin to challenge
either the Inevitability or the efficacy
of gradualness*
c. That the character of individuals rather than
social systems and arrangements is the
guarantee of justice in society.
d. That appeals to love, justice, good-will and
brotherhood are bound to be efficacious
in the end. If they have not been so to
date we mast have more appeals to love,
justice, good-will and brotherhood.
®. That goodness makes for happiness and that
increasing knowledge of this fact will
overcome human selfishness and greed,
f. That wars are stupid and can therefore only
be caused by people who are more stupid
than those who recognize the stupidity
of war*
25
While this no doubt expressed the atmosphere of American
2 lfH.-e. Rohrbach, "Reinhold Niebuhr", in Theologians of
MlLliJlib Notre Dame, 196**, p.79*
2 ^R. Niebuhr. "The Blindness of Liberalism", Radical
Religion. Autumn 193o, as cited in Arthur Schlesinger*s article
in Keglay and Bretall, op.cit.. pp.130-1.
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liberalism, it by no means expressed the attitudes of its most
violent adherents in Protestantism.

At the same time as Nie

buhr was coming under the influence of this liberalism, an ef
fort was being made to rescue Nineteenth Century Protestantism
from its individualistic and reactionary pose and restore some
form of contact with the working classes.

This took the form

of what was called the Social Gospel.
After the Pirst World War, Social Gospellsm preached
that the Kingdom of God could be realized on earth, within His
tory as it were, through the efforts of a dedicated working
class.

It was conceived that the Christian ethic was directly

applicable to social and political questions so that all one
had to ask oneself was "What would Jesus do?" and one would
have the key to unlock questions of secular policies in specific
situations.

Thus Christianity was not only a transcendent re

ligion preaching ultimate judgment and repentance? properly in
terpreted, it was also a source of Immediate answers to such
varied problems as foreign policy, farm policy, fiscal policy,
and wage-guldelines for workers in the turnip-waxing industry.
This was the democratic idealism of American liberalism boulstered with a religious sanction.

For those who felt no need

of such a sanction, the ideas of John Dewey were sufficient un
to themselves.
While it is not maintained that at one point Niebuhr was
prepared to argue for the above-listed Social Gospel formulae,
they nevertheless became of fundamental importance to Niebuhr’s
intellectual development.

At the time these doctrines were be
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ing promulgated, he had been content In his tacit liberal as
sumptions, never feeling the need of questioning in his own
mind the validity of such a position.

However, with his appoint

ment as minister of Bethel Evangelical Church in Detroit, and
the resultant first encounter with life in a huge industrial
metropolis, he soon found himself spiritually and intellectually
unprepared for what lay before him.

As he said himself:

In my parish duties I found that the simple
idealism into which the classical faith had
evaporated was as irrelevant to the crises of
personal life as it was to the complex social
Issues of an industrial city.
26
The first blows struck against this ’simple idealism’ were di
rected against its most vocal advocates in its most blatant
form —

the Social Gospel.

It was only later that Niebuhr was

able to recognize the liberal underpinnings and thereby include
himself in the indictment.

However it was through attacking

the exaggerated pose of the Social Gospel that Niebuhr finally
emerged from his Idealist shell In 1927.
After an Initial period of bitter disillusionment, Nie
buhr proceeded to hammer out, literally on paper, the political
orientation and the theological position that would succeed
where his ’simple idealism’ had failed.
sion, up to

193 6

Throughout the Depres

in fact, he flirted with various forms of pac

ifism and Marxism, (substituting in effect a secular Idealism -■
for a milder religious one): and then periodically took It all
back when he discovered that these palliatives could not relate
2%egley and Bretall, ou.cit., p.6 .
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to th® malaise of modern society.

This was his Realist period

which began with his first book. Does Civilization Reed Reli
gion? (1927) and ended with the publication of Beyond Tragedy
€1936)*

In between he wrote Leaves From th® Notebook of a

lamed Cynic (1929),
(1932), Moral Man and

Sffi&llJlgiat,
lmmoral Society (1932),

the ind of an.JBrs (193*0, and A&ilit8
Ethics. (1935), all of which were published in New fork.
In order to understand what was happening to Niebuhr at
this time, it is necessary to realise that if he might be con
sidered to be a child of American Nineteenth Century Liberalism
on the one hand, on th® other he was also a child of Nilllam
James* pragmatic revolt.

As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., points

out, Niebuhr is an instinctive empiricist with sharp political
intuitions as well as

an instinct for realism. Hisfirst re

action to any problem

has always been as a pragmatist,not as a

moralists witness the fact that he was able to discover that the
answer to the plight of automobile workers in his own parish,
lay not in some benign optimism, but in a direct program of
political and social action involving the us® of the stuff of
which politics is mad® - power*

Schlesinger continues the com

parison with James in th® following wordss
H® shared with William James a vivid sense of
th® universe as open and unfinished ....Where
James called it a 'pluralist universe*, Niebuhr
would call it a ’dynamic universe'} but the
sense of reality as untamed, streaming, provi
sional, was vital for both. Similarly both
revolted against the notion that this unpre
dictable universe could be caught and contained
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In any closed philosophical system.
Detroit had left its mark.

Mo longer could Niebuhr

rest content with the simple little moral homilies that were
so obviously irrelevant to the brutal facts of industrial life*
no longer could he preach a religion cut off from the realities
of this world by its own closed philosophical system.

What

liberal Protestantism gained by its consistent world view, it
lost in its distortion of the history of man, for as he said,
"The universe is simply not the beautiful Greek tempi© pictured
in th© philosophy of th® absolutists and the monists."2^

Sci

entific intelligence (reference to Dewey) and moral piety (ref
erence to the Social Gospel) he stated, could not abolish so
cial conflict} and those who would stake all on rational and
moralistic methods were ignoring th© limitations in human na
ture which must finally frustrate their efforts.

In other

words, the realm of love was in one place and the realm of
power was somewhere else again.

Like James, Niebuhr was faced

with a world of antinomies} a world that simply refused to re
solve Itself into unity.
Thus it was that Niebuhr came to intellectual maturity
under the Influence both of liberal Protestantism (Idealism)
and pragmatism (Realism).

His first years were occupied with

his battle against the former with all the weapons at the dis
posal of the latter.
2 7lbld.■

It is characteristic of Niebuhr that he

p.131.

28iild., p.1 3 2 .
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than decided to reverse the flow la an attempt to restate la a
constructive way the relation of ethics to politics.
Without escaping the influence of either liberal Prot
estantism or pragmatism, Niebuhr was beginning to tire of the
excesses of both.

What the then contemporary Christianity (and

particularly the Social Gospel) in America lacked was what
might be phrased, a "sense of the relative"* What pragmatism
lacked was a "sens® of the absolute".

Yet to Niebuhr there

continued to be value in each position, so neither could be
completely discarded.

He set about the task of salvaging what

was useful in each by writing An Interpretation of Christian
Ithlcs in 1935 —

a work which must stand as a cornerstone to

his attempts to achieve a synthesis of the two streams of
thought.

It was that famous chapter entitled, "The Relevance

of an Impossible Ethical Ideal" more than anything else that
demonstrated conclusively that the period of the Realist crit
ique was drawing to a close.

More than that, however; in it

were to be found the major themes that would interest Niebuhr
for the rest of his life.

For the first time he was a theolo

gian; still he was a political scientist; but what was important
was that he could be both at the same time.

Here one also sees

for the first time Niebuhr’s existentialism woven out of "para
dox", "original sin", and "agape", combining the Idealism of
the Christian gospel to save man from pessimism and complacency,
and the Realism both of pragmatism and of Niebuhr’s own view of
Christian faith to save man fro® sentimentality.

It is impor

tant however, to insist upon the fact that while the concent
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itself was a synthesl s, it rested, in its mechanics on the main
tenance of a tension between Realism and Idealism.

In other

words he was still prepared to defend the line between prag
matism and faith —

a line designed to keep the absolute out

of the relative, the relative out of the absolute, and still
allow for the final judgment of a transcendental ethic.

Schle-

slnger phrases it this ways
The penetrating critic of the Social Gospel
and of pragmatism, he ended up, in a sense,
the powerful reinterpreter and champion of
both. It was the triumph of his own remark
able analysis that it took what was valuable
in each, rescued each by defining for each
the limits of validity, and, in the end, gave
the essential purposes of both new power and
new vitality.
29
These themes were all born at various stages between the
years

1913

and

1 9 3 ^»

yet it was not until

between them was contemplated.

1935

that a balance

t$hat was sketched out in

Interpretation of. Christian Jthtcs had to be refined and de
veloped, both In its theological and political implications,
and this was undertaken in the following year in Beyond Trag
edy. With this book he at last achieved what perhaps he had
been searching for since his Detroit ministry —
fending almost everybody in one volume.

a means of of

Mot only did the vio

lent adherents of liberalism and pragmatism have to bear the
weight of his polemic, but in attempting the balance he preached,
within the historic Hebraic-Christian faith, he also subjected
traditional orthodoxy to a close scrutiny and found it wanting.
In its liberalisation into dogma of the Bible MmythaM, tradl2 9 Ibld..

p.1 ^9 .
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tional orthodoxy had created two discrete levels of being (the
eternal and the temporal), and had destroyed the dialectical
relationship between them.

Failing to perceive that "myth”

cannot speak of the trans-historical without using symbols and
events in history as its forms of expression, the Litaralists
must invariably falsify the facts of history and do irreparable
damage to any concept of history in eternity.3°

Niebuhr went

on to support the contention that the cradle of science is sur
rounded by the bodies of strangled theologians (Hercules and
the serpents) —

a phenomenon also attributed to Llteralist

obfuscation of the history - eternity relationship.
The significant fact is that Niebuhr had cleared the
stage of all the actors* Marxists, secular liberals, Protestant
liberals, pragmatists, pietistic fundamentalists, conservative
traditionalists, and Greek naturalists in order to proceed to
ward his own formulation of that Christian faith which alone
could maintain the dialectical tension with the secular world.
In a phrase, his ultimate task has been to put Christian realism
at the service of a polities of justice —
and

11justice"1

"politics” .31

tian faith.

the words "Christian"

counterpoised against the words "realism” and
Prior to that task he had to discover that Chris

What he finally created was a theological position

fully capable of supporting the whole of the Western intellec3°Ihls particular phraseology is taken from his orig
inal sketch in to
» P-23
(S.C.M. 19^8 edition).
^McCall's, gp.,„.sjList P-166.
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tual tradition, yet flexible enough to encompass modern real
ities.
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CHAPTER III

THE MATURE OF MAM, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY
L ’homme n ’est qu’un roseau, 1® plus
faibl® d® la nature $ mais c’est un roseau
peasant.
PASCAL, Pens®®s. vi. 3*f7.
’'Man. has always been his most vexing problem.
he think of himself?”

How shall

Thus begins R®inhold Niebuhr’s summa

SisslMisa*
No doubt, in presenting the thought of this great teach
er, all of Niebuhr’s reviewers have had to wrestle with the
problem of whether to deal with his theology (Logos) first, and
then his concept of man (Nous), or whether to reverse the or
der.

That is, insofar as it is Important in discussing any

thinker, to understand which attitudes are derived from which,
this sequential symbolism attains a level of meaning transcend
ing mere literary style. Is Niebuhr’s God derived from Nie
buhr’s man, or vice-versa?

It must suffice to say that Niebuhr

countenances no such distinction as far as derivation is con
cerned.

Indeed to do so would lay him open to the charge of

having short-changed one or the other, and while Niebuhr prides
himself on his "realism” in his concept of man, it would be dif
ficult for him to admit that he has thereby rendered God a lit-

vol.

1

^Niebuhr, Tiaejfatare and Destiny of Man. New York, 19^9*
, p.l.
**6
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tl© less exalted,

thus there is nothing essentially un-Niebuhr-

ian in opting for either order and as such, nothing sinister is
necessarily implied in the order of Chapters III and IV as it
stands.
But it is important to remain aware of what is implied
by the lack of implication in this question of order.
the symbol of Niebuhr's claim.

This is

He would argue that an excessive

realism which defines Sod and then finds man wanting (or per
haps thereby finds man wanting) Is no more eminently to be de
sired than an excessive idealism which first defines man and
thereby either derives a set of "inferior" (in Niebuhr's opin
ion) values, or defines man so that he may be in greater accord
with values to which Niebuhr would be more agreeable.
There is no way that one can deal with this claim at
this time without projecting the present study into a discus
sion of Niebuhr's ©pistemology (for the record, he has none:
he just starts knowing).

Whether Niebuhr's ultimate religious

principles furnish the web Into which is woven his dialectical
approach to the nature of man and the course of history, or
whether his concept of man and history necessitates his reli
gious first principles is a matter which reasonable men may
continue to debate, even if Niebuhr himself does not partici
pate in it.
However, Insofar as it bears on the presentation of
this thesis, the problem of whether to deal with Logos or Nous
first is resolved in favour of the latter for two reasons. In
the preceding definitions of Realism and Idealism, "man, poli
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tics, and society" constituted the initial variable in the equa
tion.

And as Niebuhr himself chose to begin his greatest work

with the "problem" of man, the sequence suggests itself.

Ac

cordingly, the initial discussion will concern Niebuhr’s vision
of historical political existence.
The importance of the question which opened this chap
ter is not to be gainsaid.

It is clearly unrestricted in its

scop® for it entails an analysis of the constitution of man’s
humanum in all its complexity: it requires an exploration of
the mysterious dimensions of that human being which composes
man in his existence and his essence.

It therefore follows

that Niebuhr’s answer to this question will contain the core
of his entire thought, insofar as that answer is on® aspect of
an Absolut® Reality, and of course will provide the controlling
principle of his political "system”. Thus the relevance of
this answer to the categories of Realism and Idealism will be
obvious, even if fitting it into on® of those categories is
another matter.
The problem was, in Niebuhr’s own words, to find a
philosophy of human nature and destiny
... which would reach farther into the heights
and depths of life than the medieval synthesisj
and would yet be immune to the alternate moods
of pessimism and optimism, of cynicism and of

sentimentality to which modem culture is now
so prone.
2
To Niebuhr, the great danger which all systems have courted
2 ibld.«

vol.2 , p.1 5 6 .

UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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has lain in the tendency to collapse the full measure of man
into some simplistic formula which would overstress either
man's uniqueness and dignity or his affinity with the world
of nature and his misery.

The result has always heen a fatu

ous Irrelevance to the real complexity of the issue, an ir
relevance which demonstrated itself in the pendulum swing be
tween Illusion and disillusion.

Nine out of every ten pages

in any of his works are devoted to demonstrating this irrele
vance, a fact which has given much of his writing a polemical
turn.

The tenth page has contained Niebuhr's own answer, one

that has been worked and reworked countless times.
style may change, the theme remains.

While the

It is his signature tune.

As such, the difficulty is not in finding where it is expressed
but where it is most eloquently expressed.

One wonders wheth

er it has ever been stated better than the way he presented it
in the Gifford Lectures*
The obvious fact is that man is a child of na
ture, subject to its vicissitudes, compelled
by its necessities, driven by its impulses, and
confined within the brevity of the years which
nature permits its varied organic form, allowing
them some, but not too much latitude. The other
less obvious fact is that man is a spirit who
stands outside of nature, life, himself, his
reason and the world,
3
This is Niebuhr at his best —
same breath.

affirming and denying in the

Paul Tillich once suggested, rather charitably,

that this has been due to a "predilection for paradoxical lan-

3jbid,. vol.

1

, p.3 .
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guage,,lf: others have been less kind, notably Morton White who
accuses Niebuhr of "voluntarily abandoning logic".5

it does

remain open to doubt whether this device is in fact true "par
adox" even If Niebuhr himself considers it such, but It is
clear that his estimate of man is dialectical.
character of human existence is ambiguity*

The essential

Unfortunately,

without a certain amount of explanation, Niebuhr's insight
into man seems endowed with similar characteristics.
Hiebuhrian man is basically a dual creature, that is,
a creature with a dual nature.

Though these two aspects may

be separated analytically, embodied man forever 'combines' them
and is, in fact, the result of the tension between them.

As

throughout all of Niebuhr's thought, tension is the operative
word here —

truth for Niebuhr consists in the tension main-

talned between two dialectical opposites —

and any assessment

of man must grasp the necessity of and express this tension.
Thus any single affirmation which man makes about himself in
volves him in contradictions. If he wishes to stress his own
unique and rational qualities, then his own greed and lust for
power bear witness against him*

If he asserts that men every

where are merely the product of nature and are unable to rise
above contingent circumstances, he is ignoring man the creature
k
See Paul Tillich, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of
Knowledge", Kegley and Bretall, on.clt., p.39, Dr. Tillich
argues very cogently that Niebuhr confuses "paradox" and "dia
lectic" , sometimes mistaking one for the other. Tillich does
admit that both elements are present in Niebuhr's work.
^Morton White, Social ThoughtIn America. Boston, 1959,
pp .26 3 and 26 *+.
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who dreams of Sod and aspires to male® himself God, not to men
tion the on© whose sympathy with the condition of his fallows
knows no hounds.

If ha credits man as being essentially good

and attributes all evil to concrete historical and social
causes, he merely begs the question —
the consequence?

of what are these causes

If he discovers man to be bereft of all vir

tue, his own capacity for reaching such a Judgment refutes the
terms of his judgment.
Such baffling paradoxes of human self-knowledge reveal
the vexing problem of doing justice to one or the other aspects
of man's duality.

Only a theory inspired by a knowledge of

both qualities can be considered to be adequate.
Thus throughout history Niebuhr says, human life has
incorporated and will continue to incorporate a standing para
dox,

Relying at many points on Kierkegaard, Niebuhr begins by

asserting that man is both creature and creator, made in the «
Image of God and yet finite, caught in the necessities of na
ture and yet able to transcend them.

Man is mortal, but can

look beyond his own deathf limited, but able to see beyond his
limitations.

Niebuhrian man constantly finds himself at aua

intermediary point between the world of nature and the world
of spiritj and while he is a part of nature and history (note
the separation of the two6 ), in the indeterminate scope of his
freedom, he is able to stand outside the forces of nature and
6"The freedom of the human spirit over the natural =
process makes history possible." Niebuhr, The Children of
hlght and., the. Children of Darkness. og,cit,, p,*»9.
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harness them to his will.7

Similarly he transcends concrete

historical circumstances while at the same time being a prod
uct of them.

Above all, man transcends himself.

Thus he is

capable of making himself the object of his own knowledge,
for good or ill, for insight or delusion.
Man, no matter how hard he tries, cannot entirely
escape his circumstances, his parochial outlook, and his ego
tistic self.

There will always be an element of assertive

egocentrism even in his highest flights of altruism; and it is
precisely Whan he claims that he Is being most objective that
man inserts something personal, self-enclosed and partisan in
to his thought,

Man cannot hold any point of view which is

not relative, nor ean he have anything but a limited grasp of
perfection.
And yet, despite the fact that man is the captive of
such necessities, he is also free.
a perfection beyond his grasp.

He does know that there is

He does have the capacity to

see beyond his local circumstances, recognize that some other
point of view is possible, and believe that there is such a
?Io give an example of the repetitiveness with which
•homo Niebuhrensis' is discussed, a random sampling of some of
the source material for these statements is as followsa
Moral. Man. ..and. Immoral.Soclety. op.eit,, pp.2,3,25,29.
2Li?&Etofcg.Sb p-u.-c.it..
pp.6 ,4>9,53-55,15^,187.
pp.*+-7,71-77,155,
167-70.
Christian Realism .and...P.ol.ltieal Problems, on._clt.. pp.5-7,39,
ff7"ioi7x59 i7§,i^;
Ptons_and Secular .America, QP.clt., pp.127-32,135-38.
The^Stjnicture of Nations and Empires. o£^£it•, pp.7,^0-1,
105-07,287-90,298-99.
Mania Ja.tu.re.and His Communities, on.olt., pp.30-33,S2-*+,10609,116,1.2^7
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thing as impersonality and objectivity.
Again, Niebuhr phrases it best*
In the words of Pascal, the 'dignity of man and
his misery' have the same source. Man stands
perpetually outside and beyond every social,
natural, communal, and rational cohesion. He is
not bound by any of them, which makes for his
creativity. He is tempted to make us® of all
of them for his own ends? that is the basis of
his destructiveness. One may go further and
declare that the limitless character of man’s
ideals of perfection and the inordinacy of hu
man lusts and ambitions have their common root
in the capacity of man to stand out of, and
survey, any historical or natural situation which
surrounds him.
8
Briefly, man is a creature living tensely between two
worlds or conditions* one is the actual, limited world in which
he must operate from day to day but from which he feels in some
way, however slightly, alienated.

The other is an ideal world

which, though he sees it but through the darkness of his vi
sion, is one for which he longs but from which he is permanent
ly excluded.

Thus it is the common and eternal fate of all

men that they share the role of the disappointed Idealist, for
man's nature is such that he must seek after an impossible vic
tory knowing full well that he will eventually have to adjust
himself to inevitable defeat.
The consequence of this, Niebuhr claims, is that man
experiences one basic and defining emotion —

anxiety —

that

psychological source of all great human achievements. Anxiety i
shows Itself in man's perennial sense of dissatisfaction and
^Christian leallam and Political Problems.
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5^
Is a direct product of his knowledge of M s own ambiguous and
contradictory position at the juncture of freedom and finiteness, of spirit and nature. It is the result of man’s futile
efforts to escape the demands of nature on the one hand, or of
the spirit on the other| yet it at the same time goads him in
to continuing to try to escape from flnitude to infinity, to
try to be God rather than to subject himself to the will of
God„9
Thus is anxiety the source of man’s sinfulness.

It

should be made perfectly clear at the outset that anxiety Is
not itself sin; it is merely the precondition of sin in which
man attempts to make himself the basis of his own security or
to escape the awful paradox of his own nature.

Han thus sinks

into sensuality or loses himself in fanaticism, he tries des
perately to identify his own limited and relative powers with
the Absolute.

But while anxiety produces all this, it does not

make sin logically necessary, for it must be remembered that
sin is committed in freedom.

And if sin is committed in free

dom, it therefore follows that it cannot be attributed to a
defect in man’s essence.

This is original sin —

that much-

abused doctrine as badly understood by Christians as anybody —
9»Man is ... anxious because he does not know the limits

of his possibilities.” ,TM,,
.ftdami
JhtlilflaLfig Ha&t
p.183. Thus anxiety, like frustration, can only pertain to at
tainable goals. Eventually Niebuhr has to deal with the fact,
as Browning observed, that man’s reach exceeds his grasp, and
therefore much turns on Niebuhr’s use of the verb "know”. This
should not be taken as any criticism of Niebuhr's basic thesis,
that anxiety is to be understood in its relation to freedom and
sin — a thesis which, incidentally, owes much to a similar
analysis conducted in Kierkegaard’s The Concent of Bread.
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for sin is no more and no less than the Self’s attempt to deny
its own finitude, to make itself Absolute.
At the risk of causing the reader to wonder whether
this thesis is becoming an exercise in theological semantics,
some effort should be made to explain exactly what Niebuhr as
sociates with the concept of sin In man.

This problem is mueh

more to the point than would appear at the first glance, for
it is precisely on this basis that all of Niebuhr’s liberal
critics seek to attack his ease*

Morton White comes immediately

to mind.
Niebuhr’s famous statement on this matter is as follows*
... (E)vll in man is a consequence of his inevi
table though not necessary unwillingness to
acknowledge his dependence, to accept his finiteness, and to admit his insecurity.
10
Whit© devotes a paragraph to pretending to explore th© differ
ence between "inevitable" and "necessary", spends another para
graph incorrectly explaining what Niebuhr means by the terms,
and then sums up by accusing Niebuhr of appalling "obscurant
ism".^

While not the most intelligent of Niebuhr’s liberal

critics, White’s revulsion at the concept of original sin may
be regarded as typical —

even if his attack is unique.

Niebuhr admits that th© doctrine of original sin is
somewhat absurd from th® standpoint of a pure rationalism, for
th© concept of free will that underlies it seems absurd.
10 i

a t ] g & . M < l ,,M,„H m »

Qrlg-

voi.i, p.1 5 0 .

^Morton White4 oo.cit., pp.2 6 1 -2 .
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Inal sin, which is by definition an "inherited” corruption, in
the sense that it is inevitable, is emphatically not to be re
garded as belonging to man's essential nature {in which case
it would be outside th© realm of his responsibility).

Sin is

"natural” for man in the sense that it is universal only, but
not in the sens© that it is necessary.

Neither is sin to be

regarded as a pure caprice of man's will.
It proceeds rather from a defect of the will,
for which reason it is not completely deliberate?
but since it is the will in which th® defect is
found and th® will presupposes freedom, th© de
fect cannot be attributed to a taint in man's
nature.
12
What is on© to say of free will?

Again Niebuhr relies

heavily on Kierkegaard and Pascal whan he suggests that "neces
sity” and "contingency” are terms which belong to natural sci
ence, by whose standards the polarity of freedom and destiny
in human existence constitutes logical nonsense.

Man cannot

b© free without destiny, nor can he have destiny without free
dom.*^

Th© doctrine of original sin expresses a relation be1 %atur.e.

and Destiny of Man. op.clt.. p.2^2.

^Xbld. pp.2%3 and 263* Pascal statesi "For it is be
yond doubt that there is nothing which more shocks our reason
than to say that the sin of the first man has rendered guilty
those who. being so removed from its source, seem incapable of
participating in it .... Certainly nothing offends us more
rudely than this doctrine, and yet without this mystery, the
most incomprehensible of all, w© are incomprehensible to our
selves.” i m a m & t **3 **.
Kierkegaard's explanation of th® dialectic relationship
between freedom and necessity grasps the cor© of the issue* "If
this contradiction is wrongly understood it leads to false con
cepts of original sin. Rightly understood it leads to a true
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tv®an fate and freedom which cannot b© fully rationalized, for
it must do Justice to the fact that self-love and self-centred
ness in existential man is inevitable, but not in such a way as
to fit into the category of natural necessity.
Before concluding these remarks on the nature of man,
perhaps a few ancillary statements should be directed to the
implications of what has Just been discussed, and in particular
to the last foot-note,

this brief encounter with Niebuhr's

concept of sin has served several purposes.

It has first of

all established that Niebuhr believes man to be sinful not be
cause of bad education, mental disease, or unjust social condi
tions, but because of man's reaction to his own anxiety.

It

has also demonstrated that Niebuhr affixes a constant to human
activity in a moral dimension, beyond which existential man
cannot go.

Sin is inevitable and will never be exorcised.

Thus there is in man as Niebuhr sees him, a certain perversity
or discordance that produces disharmony in th® relation of man
to his community or to the Universe.
But beyond this, beyond the precise attributes that
Niebuhr ascribes to man’s humanum. there is a significance to
concept, to the idea namely that every individual is itself and
the race, and that th® later individual is not significantly
differentiated from the first man. In the possibility of anx
iety freedom is lost, for It is overwhelmed by fate. Yet now
it arises in reality, but with an explanation that it has be
come guilty." T M Concent of,.,,Bread. p.105.
More than the preceding analysis of Niebuhr's concept
of sin, these two quotations embody an essential aspect of Nie
buhr's thought — his case against reason when it is used as
anything more than a technique (reason, in the sense of instru
mental rationalism).
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his position which distinguishes it from those views of man
held by various other political philosophers.

It lies in th®

"method of thought" typified by these preceding statements on
the nature of sin but by no means exhausted by them.

The ques

tion may be phrased this way* what role does reason play in
the formation of that realm of meaning in which Niebuhr places
man?

It now becomes clear on the one hand that the problem

of meaning, a basic problem in religious thought, transcends
the ordinary rational problem of tracing the relation of things
to each other in th® sense that it must be determined whether
or not they contradict.

On the other hand, Niebuhr seems to

favour employing reason as a rationalistic pattern in the form
of a technique.

N.J. Wolf adumbrated Niebuhrian dialectical

analysis in the following manners

1

) state two opposite facts

of any human problem,

2)

positive elements,

correlate th© sub-negation of the basic

3)

reduce each further to negative and

affirmation with the sub-positive of the basic negation, *+) show
how the Christian answer meets these complexities in the whole
ness of the problem.^
It must be remembered that there are two sources of
Niebuhr's insight —

experience and revelations the former,

for what It is worth, being probably led by the nose by the
latter.

To what extent his view is Christian or Biblical may

be a matter of no small debate, but the fact remains that Nie
buhr the mystic does not feel compelled to yield the right of
i^Nllliam John Wolf, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of
Man", Kegley and Bretall, oo.cit., p.231*
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way to Niebuhr the logician.
Formerly there can be, of course, no conflict
between logic and truth. The laws of logic
are reason*® guard against chaos in the realm
of truth. They eliminate contradictory as
sertions. But there is no resource in logical
rules to help us understand complex phenomena,
exhibiting characteristics which seem to re
quire that they be placed into contradictory
categories of reason.
15
Such are the epistemological distinctions that must be
made on Niebuhr's behalf that he has given many th# impression
that he is an irrational!st.

It is this writer's conviction

that such an impression is wrong, for while Niebuhr may express
reservations with regard to instrumental rationalism, it by no
means follows that he makes hash of reason.

While reason may

not have created the paradox, it can entertain the concept with
out being destroyed.

Niebuhr himself likes to quote Max Scholar

who defined the distinction between reason and meaning as fol
lows*
A problem of reason would be the followings
*1 have a pain in my am. Where did it come
from and how may I be rid of it?' To deter
mine that is a task of science. But I may
use the pain in my arm to reflect upon the
fact that th© world is tainted with pain,
evil and sorrow. Then I will asks 'What is
pain, evil, and sorrow essentially, making
pain as such, without reference to my par
ticular pain, possible?’
16
If, in terms of theology, the observable expression of

anxiety is sin, in politics according to Niebuhr, it is the ^
1^Nature and Destiny of Man. on.cit.« vol.l, p.2 6 2 .
16Max Scheler, Me,.Stelluni:....Ate Menschen im Kosmas.
p .68 as cited in ibid., p.16*+.
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will-to-power.

Anticipating the peril in which he stands, man

transmutes his natural instinct for survival (his will-to-live)
into two spiritualized forms.

On© form is the desire to ful

fill the potentialities of life and not merely to maintain its
existence5 for man, unlike an animal, cannot just live.

He is

driven to seek the realization of his true nature, whatever
that is.

This may be called th© "will-to-self-raalizatlon",

which is subject to the paradox that in order to be achieved,
it must be the result of self-giving, but cannot be its intend
ed consequence.1 -7
The other form is th© desire for power and glory.

Anx

iety issues in pride wherein the human ego assumes its selfsufficiency if it can only make itself secure enough| thus
pride issues in the will-to-power.18

The conflicts between

men are thus never simple conflicts between competing survival
impulses, but taka on a spiritualized form and as usual, are
thereby subject to another paradox —
adox,

this time, a tragic par

It consists in the fact that while it might be assumed

that those who attain great power have thus conquered insecuri
ty, the fact is that once embarked on its quest for security,
there is no point at which the Self can feel satisfied in hav
ing enough security.^
iftlMia M i 1 U £gniljia§)

l8 T.k9.4hlltoiuiC.M gjit, M A

fiM Ito a

pp.106-7.

on.eit.. pp. 18-22. The quintessence of pride Is spiritual
pride or self-righteousness. In addition to pride of power,
there is also intellectual and moral pride.

»

^Thus Hiebuhr criticizes Erich Fromm's belief that the
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This of course loads Niebuhr to that great touchstone
of Realist political thought, the securlty-and-power dilemma,
about which little need b© said.
similar to that of Herz —

His usage of th® concept is

both would call it a basic irra

tionality but a fact in politics.
The most important aspect of this discussion should by
now be obvious.

Niebuhr relates the security-and-power dilem

ma to the will-to-power, which he relates in turn to anxiety,
freedom and sin.

It is clear that corrective therapy cannot

eliminate it, nor can tinkering with political and social in
stitutions, nor can better education.

It Is a basic part of

existential man.
This then is Niebuhr’s anthropology —
man.

his doctrine of

As Kenneth Thompson has observed, in making this the

centre of his ’’system”, Niebuhr has more in common with the
traditional political philosophers than with many of his pre
sent day contemporaries.

Th© practice of rooting political

theory In political institutions and processes, rather than
probing deeper to the level of human nature apparently belongs
to the last few decades.2^

As Niebuhr’s political thought is

further explored, ©specially with regard to his criticisms of
other political theories, the full implications of this central
capacity to love is a ’’phenomenon of abundance” of attained
security (
f f i U L > PJUSlt., p.109).
20Kenneth Thompson, ’’The Political Philosophy of Rein
hold Niebuhr”, Kegley and Brstall, on.cit., p.162-3. He quotes
Niebuhr as asking* "Is it possible to lead man out of the so
cial confusion into an ordered society if we do not know man a
little better than either Marxians or liberals know him?”
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position will become perhaps a little clearer.
Before leaving this exposition of Niebuhr's concept of
man, it may be of some interest to the reader to discover the
name by which this concept goes.

So far it has been called

merely "Niebuhr's view of man"* It will already have occurred
to some readers that it might also be called "the Christian
view" or "Christian Realism".

This is what in fact Niebuhr

does call it (alternately "the Biblical view" by which he means
th© Judaio-Christlan heritage), but frequently it is done with
out any evident precise meaning.

It is not even clear how he

Intends to employ the terms "Christian" or "Christianity" .21
At various times he wishes to oppose Hebraic to Graeco-Hellenlstic concepts, sometimes he is referring to Protestantism as
opposed to Catholicism (especially in matters relating to nat
ural law), most of the time he has in mind a consistent faith
of some sort which may be distinguished from both classical
rationalism and Oriental mysticism.
Yet the question remains, is there a consistent Biblical
view of any one major theological theme, and even if there is,
is not Niebuhr's interpretation contradicted by many other In
terpretations that have just as good a claim as his own to con
stitute th® "Biblical view"?

It must be admitted that Niebuhr

makes a very strong case for a consistent viewpoint, and in
using it to such advantage as he does, to examine alternative
systems, Niebuhr makes It appear as if no other Biblical inter21 fhls is done so frequently that references are proba
bly needless. See Faith and History. (New York), 19^9, Chaps.
7 and 8 } The Nature and Destiny of Man. vol.l, Chaps. 1 and 5.
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pretatlon could carry on an effective dialogue.

However, the

consistency of the Bible with regard to a particular concept
of man is hardly apoint of necessary debate in this thesis.
Similarly, insofar as Niebuhr relies upon the effectiveness
of a Biblical challenge to th© shortcomings of rival philos
ophies, to buttress his own claim to Biblical rectitude, the
argument is of little concern here.

Nevertheless, it is of

direct relevance to examine Niebuhr*s assessment of rival con
cepts of man and methods of understanding man, if only to de
termine to what extent Niebuhr is correct in labelling his
thought "Christian Realism", with the accent on "Realism".
It has already been suggested many times that Niebuhr
roots his political theory in a concept of human nature, yet
it has never been fully stated why. It is primarily a question
of the alternativemethods which are at the disposal of the
political theorist*

Contemporary thought has assumed that the

proper method for th© study of politics is that which has been
so successful in the natural or physical world.

It has been

widely claimed that all that separated the physical and social
sciences has been an unfortunate cultural lag resulting from
the us© of archaic and imprecise methods by backward and un
sophisticated social scientists.

The techniques of social

science have lagged far behind those of the natural or labora
tory sciences and all that theory has needed to develop has
been the realization that the scientific method is directly
relevant to the understanding of political phenomena.
Niebuhr *s attitude to the rola of the scientific method
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in this area has hean almost unreservedly critical.

Thus he

has been forced to go in search of an alternative to it.

This

alternative is political philosophy, and political philosophy
as Niebuhr comprehends it, involves the presentation of an
interpretation of the meaning of history.

This being the case,

at some point th® political philosopher must make explicit his
theory of human nature.

Thus any understanding of political

phenomena is inseparable from a clear picture of human nature.
This then is Niebuhr’s first broadside at modern
thought, and before dealing with alternative concepts to his
view of human nature, it would seem logical to deal with that.
His target, what has so far been referred to as the scientific
method, Niebuhr calls "scientism*4.
Niebuhr's criticism is aimed at the social scientist's
unqualified trust in th® scientific method and not at its le
gitimate functions.

He would concede for instance that in the

at times vicious debate between the advocates of free enter
prise and collectivism, empirical studies of reality are often
th® only basis for political choice to the extent that these
studies limit themselves to practical questions such as the
role of property in an agrarian society as compared to an in
dustrial society.
But otherwise, th® value of "scientific" studies of
human behaviour is very questionable, for the scientific ap
proach to this area of study is based on five tenuous assurap-
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tlonss22 l)it believes that Its approach Is presuppositionless,
whereas it is In fact Impossible to give form or meaning to
any social research in th© absence of a framework?

2)

while

“science” as empiricism means humility before th© faets, “sci
ence" as rationalism means th® invoking of logical coherence
as th© test of truth, which prompts men to deny obvious facts
if they appear to violate the tenets of coherence?

3)

it as

sumes that the social observer is not involved In the reality
he observes and can operate as pure mind without ideological
taint, national loyalty or social and economic status affect
ing his judgment| k) modern conceptions of causation and pre
diction ignore the complexity of causation and the Intervention
of contingent factors in history, including the human agent
(thus the world Is not a repeatable laboratory experiment);
and

5)

it believes that science is th© profoundest, because it

is th© latest, fruit of culture in accordance with Auguste
Comte's concept of the history of culture as the movement from
a religious to a metaphysical to a scientific age.2^
The dubious dogmas that inform and strengthen these
illusions are two, namely, that man can be controlled as a
piece of nature and that man is infinitely perfectible.2*4. As
a M H & it o y t .ffiP.tSi.V, p . 53. and fifag jU iA ia

p.1**
23chrlstlan Realism and Political Problems, o.p.,cIt..p. 3.
2*4Possibly one of the better sources for a view of
scientism is afforded by Hoitan P. Odegard's book, Sin and
Science. Antioch Press, (1956). Two quotations should suf
fice to present a general pictures
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a pair of assertions supposedly leading to a consistent posi
tion, one might expect to find them less contradictory, for
on© is the essence of fatalism and the other is the essence
of voluntarism.

Th® tendency to equate history with nature

and to confuse the "laws of nature" with those of politics and
history has given rise to a determinism which minimizes the
creative role of man.

The moat consistent application of this

determinism is th® economies of laissez fair®, drawn from physiocratic theory, which warns men not to interfere with the
"natural" processes and "natural" balances of history.

But

th© tendency to equate history with nature can also inspire a
contrary voluntarist!® theory according to which man is called
upon to us® scientific technics to manage history and politics,
as h© has managed nature.

What man can do about the peril of

th® hydrogen bomb is regarded as equally manageable as the
physical forces which produced the bomb.2^
The equation is really quit® simple.

As long as human

reason can discern the laws which control the world of nature,
and as long as there is no difference between nature and his—
"Opposition of freedom to authority, or freedom to or
der is on® of th® fallacious attitudes men have fallen into
while floundering around trying to adjust to and understand the
fdatively new situation of social fluidity .... If organized
inquiry, the method of operative perfectible knowledge, is ac
cepted as authoritative, there is a possibility of organically
uniting freedom and authority, freedom and order, in a way at
tuned to the fluctuating times." (p.1 ^2 )
"A theorist is a thinker who, when he finds that his
problems are 'insoluble1, questions the problems and tries to
reformulate them so that they can be solved." (p.1 6 5 )
Affierlcan..H.i,story, g.p.^it., pp.80-1.
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tory, than human reason can ultimately manage politics and
history.

If modem man cannot determine whether he shall under

stand himself from the standpoint of the uniqueness of his
reason or from the standpoint of his affinity with nature,
scientism says that it does not matter, for that human reason
allows him unlimited control over his position in nature.

The

deficiency of both liberal and Marxist theory is just this
tendency to see man merely fro® this viewpoint of modern nat
uralistic rationalism*
This surely is a too simple and premature solution, but
it is typical of modern man in his naive optimism.

Secure in

his neat certainties about himself, he has destroyed the ten
sion between finitud© and freedom in his nature, in favour of
the latter.

As a result, nothing stands in the way of unlimited

progress in history and man can perfect himself.
Consequently, the idea that man is sinful at the very
centre of his personality, that is, in his will, is thereby
universally rejected.

It is this rejection which has seemed

to make the Christian gospel simply irrelevant to modern man,
a fact which is of much more importance than any conviction
about its incredibility.

The idea of modern liberalism that

there is progress in history, the belief in the indefinite
perfectibility of man, represents the most systematic effort
in all of human history to get around the fact of sin and to
deny that man is a limited and finite creature.
very principle of sin —

This is the

the attempt to deny it —

converted
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Into a philosophy and it has left the modern era without an
outlook that can deal with the real world.

These are the

children of light who ”... are usually foolish because they do
not know the power of self-will.”26

This sentimental delusion

about the nature of man and history is responsible for the
follies, self-deceptions, and arrogant hopes on which the
modern era has at times foundered disastrously.

The belief in

the natural goodness and malleability of man explains why mod
ern liberals were so late in recognising the true nature of
Fascism.

The idea that evil is social in its origins and can

be eliminated by social engineering explains why so many have
been seduced by Communism.

The concept that when man progres

ses in knowledge he also progresses in virtue explains why
modern society has had a manic-depressive character, moving
from bouts of utopian enthusiasm at one extreme to bouts of
cynical disillusion and despair at the other.

With such blind

faith in human nature and human reason, the only word that can
describe liberalism is ’benign*.
What the children of light have dispensed with in their
sentimentality is that sine qua non of all politics —

power.

Liberalism Insists that justice can be maintained through the
working of a free economic system, that a simple social harmony
can be achieved by a "cool prudence and a calculating egotism"
—

in short it has failed to relate the individual organically

26?he Children of Light and the Children of Darkness.
.QP.t.Sl,t., p.11.
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to society.2?

In analyzing the relationship between nations

and the international community again modern liberal culture
has shown its sentimentality in its universails® and faith in
the growth of law.2®
In this manner, Niebuhr introduces the second touch
stone of Realist political thought —
in social relationships.

the necessity of power

Here to Niebuhr lay the value of

Marxism, for Marxism while still being part of the heritage of
the children of light in terms of its illusions about the na
ture of history, had come to terms with power.

While liberal

ism sought to solve the great problem of justice In society by
asking people to be more kind and loving, Marxism knew that
justice cannot be established without a struggle in which the
Interests of the victims of injustice are set against those
of the beneficiaries of injustice.
But Marxism errs on two counts: In the first place, to
Niebuhr, the Illusion that the classless society will eliminate
the problem of power is as utopian as the sentimentality of
liberalism.

In the second place, disproportions of power any

where in the human community are sources of injustice.

The

power monopoly of a class becomes the monopoly of the party
which claims to be the vanguard of the whole class: the monop
oly of the party gradually becomes the monopoly of a small
oligarchy, and then the dictatorship of the oligarchy further
27jiia., P.3 1 .
28 iMd-t

pp.33-^1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70
degenerates into the dictatorship of a single tyrant.

OQ

Thus

some type of distributive balance of power Must be achieved.
Herein lies the third touchstone of Realist political thought the counterbalancing of interests to secure a reasonable Justice
in lieu of any more satisfactory arrangement.
These twin problems of power —

the perennial neces

sity of it in social relationships, and the prevention of its
being accumulated by on® group —

constitute the essential mes

sage of Moral Man and Immoral Society. Individuals, he argues,
qua individuals, may have lofty sentiments and noble inten
tions? they may in personal relationships do commendable work
which Is a benefit to the community.

But collective man —

man as he acts through classes, races, nations, parties —

is

basically '‘immoral*’. The struggle among any associations of
human beings is essentially a matter of power rather than mo
rality.
It may be possible, though it is never easy,
to establish Just relations between individuals
within a group purely by moral and rational
suasion and accomodation. In inter-group
relations this is practically an impossibility.
The relations between groups must therefore
always be predominantly political rather than
ethical ... •
3^
v

29SAris.tlan

pp .33-^2 .

Realism and Political Problems. oa.cit.*

S q&Xm
aiu,gA$,«> pp.xxii xxlii. Niebuhr would agree with Robert Osgood’s statement of
this problem* "A citizen's dependence upon his nation assumes
a distinct Intimacy because ha confers upon the object of his
allegiance the attributes of a person so closely identified
with his own personality that he virtually acquires a second
self, in whose behalf he can feel friendly, hostile, generous,
selfish, confident, afraid, proud, or humiliated almost as
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Furthermore, the natural egotism of such association of human
beings is so great that a tolerable justice can only be achieved by guaranteeing to each group enough power to counter
balance that of other groups by which it might be exploited.3^
This balance of power Niebuhr calls "managed anarchy",
for when not consciously manipulated, it does not develop into
a perfect equilibrium and anarchy invariably overcomes the
management in the end.

It is clear that Niebuhr is quite pre

pared to distinguish between national and international sys
tems, for the manipulator he has in mind is the force of gov
ernment.-^2
Since there is no power of government transcending the
conflicts of nations which might be able to arbitrate the
struggle from an impartial perspective, whatever order is achleved in international society stems from the imposition of
preponderant power by on® or more of the interested partici
pants.

When this Is coupled with the fact that the group,

according to Niebuhr, is more arrogant, hypocritical, selfpolgnantly as he would feel these emotions for himself in his
relations with other individuals. However, the conscience of
this vicarious personality* unlike the private conscience, is
relieved by the sanction of patriotism, so that a citizen can
manage with a sense of complete moral consistency to combine
lofty altruism toward his own nation with extreme egoism to
ward other nations and thereby actively support a standard of
ethics in foreign relations which he would not dream of tol
erating in his private dealings.” (Ideals and Self-Interest in
America's Foreign Relations, op.clt.. p.11.5
Qp„,ci,t.., pp.8 ff,ll>+ ff.
32 Tfa® Children of Light and the Children of Darkness,
op.clt** p.171**

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72
centred and more ruthless in the pursuit of its ends than the
individual, the best that can be expected of them is that
they should Justify their hypocricies by a slight measure of
real international achievement and attempt to do Justice to
wider interests than their own, while they pursue their

o w n . 33

The question then, at this point surely is, why is
there no international government?

Niebuhr rests his entire

case on two major points: that governments are not simply
created by flat, and that governments are evidence of but do
not create community.

No group of individuals, he argues,

has ever created either government or community out of whole
cloth.

Furthermore, the community, in at least inchoate form,

is prior to its laws, and the authority of government is pri
on

marily the authority of the community itself.J

In this manner does Niebuhr deal with the arguments
of the stupid children of light who have correctly perceived
the need of bringing individual and group interests into a
3% o r a l Man and Immoral Society, op.clt.. p.108.

3^Chrlstlan Realism and Political Problems, op.clt..
pp.17-22. But there is tension in even this analysis. To cut
man’s achievements off at this point would be to accentuate
his finiteness at the expense of his indeterminate freedom.
Thus Niebuhr is required to add:
"To call attention to this fact does not mean that all
striving for a higher and wider integration of the world com
munity is vain. That task must and will engage the conscience
of mankind for ages to come. But the edifice of government
which we build will be sound and useful if its height is pro
portionate to the strength of the materials from which it is
constructed." Ibid., p.29.
Even so, it will be noticed that Niebuhr has not denied
that there are limits. His genius appears to consist in the
fact that he consistently refuses to specify them short of say
ing that man cannot achieve the ultimate.
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working harmony for the sake of total community by their internationalistic aspirations, but have failed to understand
how difficult of hop© are these realisations.

Similarly h©

has refuted the position of those who would hold out optimis
tic prospects for a perfect Justice in domestic society.

And

of course, he has done the same thing to the argument that
man himself is perfectible.

To Niebuhr it is significant

that he has had to do this? that his battles have been with
the children of light, the sentimentalists, rather than with
the children of darkness, the moral cynics.

Human history is

the record of man's recurrent efforts to overstep the bounds
which have been set upon his existence, and what happens in
history is an ironic comment on this human pretension.
Niebuhr, the great events of history —

For

the rise and fall of

social institutions, the breakdown of old social classes and
the emergence of new ones, the revolutions and wars, the great
hopes with which social movements begin and the great disap
pointments with which they end —

are neither episodes in a

meaningless cycle of birth and decay (Greek naturalism), nor
agents in the progressive realisation of truth and goodness
(modern liberalism).

They are testaments in history to the

Judgment of the Absolut®, they are witnesses to the fact that
men strive for a fulfillment in history which is not there.

1

When man fails to see that this Absolute stands irretrievably
above and outside history, he commits the sin of pride and acts
as though the ends he seeks in history are absolute and final.
This increases his anxiety.
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To many, such an outlook appears permeated with pes
simism.

Everywhere it seems, Niebuhr lays down limits beyond

which man cannot pass and to this extent it must be stated
that Niebuhr is a Realist.
But he is also a Christian realist.

He has drawn a

picture of man as limited and free, as aware for the most part
that he lives and acts under a norm that transcends the real
ities with which he must deal.

In order to do justice to his

own tension, he must establish some relevance between that
transcendent norm and historical actuality.

The question of

how Niebuhr relates the two, as well as the questions of the
significance of all these limitations on man In practical terms,
and the nature of the norm, will be the subject of the follow
ing discussion.
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CHAPTER I?
THE ABSOLUTE AND NIEBUHR’S RATIONAL
AND MORAL ORDER
Audi partem alteram.
ST. AUGUSTINS, De Duabus Animabus. XIV. ii.
The order of the terms which constitute the definitions
of Political Realism and Political Idealism outlined in Chapter
I would seem to require that the following discussion concern
itself solely with Niebuhr’s Logos (ultimate principles from
which Is derived his rational and moral order) per se, leaving
to a concluding chapter any discussion of the relationship be
tween that Logos and the nous described in Chapter III.

That

is to say, consistency with the ’’equation" necessitates ab
stracting Niebuhr’s Absolute for the purposes of analysis, all
the while avoiding the temptation of drifting into any discus
sion of that Absolute’s meaning (id est. relevance).

In theo

logical terms, this involves

to dis

taking apart the Trinity

cuss God the Father (the God who does not enter history) with
out any reference to God the

Son (the God of history)

relationship between the two.

or the

Or perhaps more significantly,

it is the Civitas Dei as opposed to the Civitas Terrana. to
put it in Augustinian terms.

75
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It may seem somewhat risible, not to say pointless, to
enclose this aspect of Niebuhr’s thought in one ludicrously
short chapter.

The explanation is that while Niebuhr devotes

virtually no time and no effort to describing the nature of
his Absolute and its ideal society in isolation, (preferring
rather to discuss it in relation to the temporal world), and
consequently leaves one with little to say that is not St.
Augustine’s Kingdom of Heaven warmed over, it is Important
that this thesis distinguish markedly the two variables in
the Realist-Idealist definitions, especially in applying them
to Niebuhr who, it must be remembered, attempts to transcend
both.

Accordingly, to avoid confusion, this chapter will deal

exclusively with a brief summary of Niebuhr's rational and
moral order.**"
Niebuhr describes his Heavenly City in the following
manner:
3-11 must be admitted before proceeding any further,
that this particular device of abstracting Niebuhr’s moral or
der to avoid reference to the temporal order, is most definit
ely un-Niebuhrian, if not anti-Niebuhrlan. It is with good
reason that Niebuhr fails to discuss this realm in isolation,
for, save for the purpose of exposition, the Kingdom of Heaven
is not to be seen or explored as if It were a segregated other
worldly dimension of Being. The kingdom which is not of this
world is yet in this world, through man and in man, who is in
this world and yet not altogether of this world. True to the
Augustlnian roots of his thought, Niebuhr consistently refuses
to make what he considers to be the mistake of classical (Greek)
thought which tended to a radical dualism in its treatment of
the temporal and "divine1' orders.
A good treatment of Niebuhr’s attitude may be found in
Chapter XIV of Beyond Tragedy. New York, 1937 > PP»273— 86, en
titled "The Kingdom Not of This World". Whereas the reader
might be led to expect a discussion of Niebuhr's ideal order,
he is treated to a dissertation on how that order is relevant
to history.
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The Kingdom of God, the kingdom of truth, is
not of this world .... Its servants do not
fight. They do not set power against power....
The truth is ... a revelation of the fundamental
pattern of life which sin has obscured and which
Christ restores. The Logos is the very pattern
of the world .... The kingdom of truth is con
sequently not a kingdom of some other world.
It is the picture of what this world ought to
be .... In every moment of existence those
’who are of the truth' hear Christ’s voice,
warning, admonishing, guiding them in their
actions .... The vision of God reveals their
true centre and source of existence.
2
Two basic assertions emerge from this series of state
ments.

In the first place it is clear that in this rational

and moral order, "power" in its political sense, has no place.
The implications of this are mammoth,

Niebuhr has just dis

posed of the security-and-power dilemma, the will-to-power,
the will-to-liva, and, in doing so, by definition has also
eliminated sin and Its root, anxiety.
The initial question one supposes is, how is anxiety
eliminated?

It will be recalled that man experiences anxiety

when, in consequence of his realization of his own finitude,
he attempts to make himself his own end, to translate his
finite existence into a more permanent and absolute form of
existence —

in short, to make himself God.

Thus it must be

assumed that if anxiety is to be eliminated, man must come to
terms with his own finitude and seek to ground his existence
in the Eternal and Absolute Reality.

Niebuhr would call this

a transformation into the wlll-to-self-realization.

2IMd.
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Of what nature then is man. that he finds his own self
too small to encompass the self?
the limitations of the self —

Surely his dimensions exceed

in other words, man .is self

transcendent in his nature.
(This) ... describes the actual situation of
the self, which destroys itself by seeking it
self too immediately. The true self dies if
the contingent self tries too desperately to
live.
3
Logically, the next question is, how does man transcend
himself?

Niebuhr's answer is, through agape —

that sacrifi

cial, heedless, and universal love which makes no concessions
to any self-regarding impulses and denies any and every form
of self-assertion, even those "natural" prudent defences of
the self which are required through the will-to-live by the
egoism of others.

And man cannot even consciously aim to tran

scend himself, for that too is self-assertive.
For the kind of self-giving which has selfrealization as its result must not have selfrealization as its conscious end: otherwise
the self by calculating its enlargement will
not escape from itself completely enough to
be enlarged.
b
This involves Niebuhr in yet another paradox.

If love

is the means to self-realization yet cannot be used as such;
if love is the norm yet cannot be regarded as an obligation or
duty without defeating Itself —

in what way can one speak of

3ffalth and History, op.cit., p.17^.
^Christian Realism and Political Problems, op.cit.,

p.im.
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love as being related to man in Niebuhr's rational and moral
order?

What is the relationship between duty and inclination,

or between love
grace

as commandment and the spontaneity of the

to love? The answer

isthat agape must be seen in the

form of both "love as law" and "love beyond the limits of law".
Now love implies an uncoerced giving of the
self to the object of its devotion. It is
thus a fulfillment of the law; for in perfect
love all law is transcended and what is and
what ought to be are one.
To command love is a paradox; for love
cannot be commanded or demanded. To love God
with all our hearts and all our souls and all
our minds means that every cleavage in human
existence is overcome. But the fact that such
an attitude is commanded proves that the cleav
age is not overcome; the command comes from one
side of reality to the other, from essence to
existence.
5
This leads directly to the second of the two basic as
sertions contained in that description of the Heavenly City —
an assertion that lies at the core of Niebuhr's theistic
existentialism and permits Niebuhr ultimately to transcend the
categories of Realism and Idealism.

The Logos and all that is

implied thereby constitute that of which the Earthly City is
the existential form.

The man of the Heavenly City is essen

tial man.
Niebuhr describes essential man in the following man
ner;
The essential nature of man contains two elements;
and there are correspondingly two elements in the
^An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, op.cit.. pp.20910. For a fuller discussion, see also Christian Realism and
Political Problems, op.cit., Chapter X.
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original perfection of man. To the essential
nature of man belong, on the one hand, all his
natural endowments, and determinations, his
physical and social impulses, his sexual and
racial differentiations, in short his character
as a creature imbedded In the natural order.
On the other hand, his essential nature also
includes the freedom of his spirit, his tran
scendence over natural process and finally his
self-transcendence.
6
In thus describing the essential nature of man as finite free
dom, Niebuhr necessarily resists any attempt to discuss man's
essential nature in definite terms as if it were a fixed and
static possession.

This is in fact what he objects to most

strongly in naturalism, rationalism, romanticism, and all con
cepts of natural law; the tendency to make reference to a fixed
and given human nature.

Man is largely what he becomes; he is

not ready-made at the outsat.

There are no fixed structures 1

of nature or reason or history which man does not transcend by
virtue of his spiritual freedom.'

Thus man stands before pos

sibilities for action which are not calculated in terms of the
potentialities of a fixed essential nature of any sort.
This does not mean that man in his essential form has
become perfect in the sense of having lost his finitude.
he is to be distinguished from sinful existential man.

But
It will

be recalled that anxiety, not finitude is the root of sin, and
it is this anxiety which prompts existential man to differ in
the following manner: (a) man as sinner is not unmindful of
the ultimate requirements of his nature as free spirit.

He

% h e liature and Destiny of M an. op.cit.. vol. 1, p.270.
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knows that any particular historical concretion of law is not
enough*, (b) he is not fully conscious of the nature of these
ultimate requirements; and (c) he is not ready to meet these
requirements once they are defined.?
In this manner does Niebuhr relate aaane to essential
man.

Anything less rigorous must fail to captivate and ful

fill the special dimension of freedom in man's essential nature.
Love contains no coda or fixed form to be imposed upon human
freedom but man's transcendent freedom is "in order to love",
and love is ordained as the law for his life

in freedom.

belongs therefore to the nature of essential

man.

Love

From thus

defining the essence of man, Niebuhr has at once defined the
natural norm for essential man.
The law of love is the final law for man in
h:ls condition of finiteness and freedom because
man in his freedom Is unable to make himself
in his finiteness his own end. The self is
too great to be contained within Itself in
its smallness.
8
Thus existential man is not the source of the norm for
his essence, nor are the fixed structures of

history.

What

this is, is a love absolutism which expresses itself in terms
of a universalism set against all narrower forms of human sym
pathy.

It must always provide a perspective from which all

lesser norms pertaining to essential man can be viewed.

Not

only is it alone capable of relevance to man's finite freedom,
P. 238.

°Falth and History, op.clt.. p.174-.
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but through this love of God and man, men are all perfectly
related to each other, for all men are related in terms of
perfect obedience and love to the centre and source of their
existence.
The pieces now begin to fall into place.

If, as Mie- L-

buhr often suggests, moral life is at all possible only in a
meaningful existence, Niebuhr must take steps to make it mean
ingful.

So far he has related the sacrificial ethic of the

rational and moral order to the essential man of the same or
der.

It remains to be seen how he relates this now to exis

tential man in history, both in terms of his individual life v
and his collective engagements.

This will Involve maintaining

some type of tension between the empirical world and the ra
tional ideal.
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CHAPTER V
THE DIALECTICS OF AN EXISTENTIAL

SYNTHESIS

The self Is the conscious synthesis of the
limited and the unlimited which is related to
itself and the task of which is to become a
self, a task which can be realized only in re
lation to God. To become a self means to be
come concrete. But to become concrete means
to be neither limited nor unlimited, for that
which must become concrete is a synthesis.
Therefore development consists in this: that
In the eternal!zatlon of the self one escapes
the self endlessly and in the temporalization
of the self one endlessly returns to the self.
8GREN KIERKEGAARD, Die Krankhelt zum Tode. p.2?.
Political Realism and Political Idealism, it will be
recalled, are terms whose applicability to any political system
depends on the relationship in history established between the
empirical world and a rational and moral order.

Both Realist

and Idealist must at some point make three separate statements
concerning 1) the nature of man, politics, and society; 2) the
nature of the Absolute and its attendant ultimate values; and
3) the degree to which the former can approach in history any
conceptual order derived from the latter.

The definitive cri

terion Is thus whether or not any political theory states or
Implies that there can be progress in history toward a concrete
embodiment of an ideal world however constructed, and that at
some point in time, the ideal will be, in the vernacular, "ac83
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8*4tualized".

The Idealist says yes, whatever we wish is pos

sible; the world is slowly progressing.

The Realist says no,

what already exists must be the limit of the possible; the
world has not changed since Adam and will not change, save
for the interminable redistribution of power in which empires
wax and wane and tyranny alternates with anarchy.

This is

clearly what is meant here by the words "relationship in
history", and as such, it is a straightforward and concise
proposition.

As a conceptual scheme it should be relevant to

all political philosophies and in fact, is.

With regard to

Niebuhr its relevance is assured, for Niebuhr is quite explic
it in his verdict on man’s chances for achieving the ideal
order in history? just as explicit as he is in his verdict on
the assertion that nothing more is possible for man in history.
But just because it may be relevant to Niebuhr’s case, does
not say that it can contain him.
In the first place it will soon be demonstrated that
Niebuhr is a "bridga-builder", in the sense that the term was
made to have previously,^ for if the posited distinction
(Realism and Idealism) between political systems assumes that
the relationship between the ideal and the actual is summed
up in the question "what Is possible?", it is conceivable that
one could avoid stating either that the ultimate is possible
or that nothing more is possible.

In the second place, it

will be demonstrated that the definitions of Political Realism
^-See above, Chapter I , p.17.
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and Political Idealism as constructed in this thesis, for
reasons to be outlined now, do not exclude other possibili
ties? and then it will be shown that Niebuhr ultimately tran
scends both categories.
Insofar as the Reaiist-Ideallst dichotomy does not
exclude other possibilities, the key words are "relationship
in history".

As already stated, the definitions refer to the

possibilities of a concrete embodiment in history of the ra
tional and moral order.

But here a difficulty arises —

one

which questions exactly what is meant by the phrase "relation
ship in history", when Interpreted literally.
terpretation of the phrase possible?

Is another in

Can it be demonstrated

that the ideal order and the empirical world of history are
related in yet another way?

Surely, to consider the relation

ship solely in terms of the possibilities of decreasing the
dialectical tension between the two realms, to limit oneself
to speculation on the likelihood of a merging, is only half
the picture.

Thus, if Niebuhr can relate the two orders in

yet another way, he will have effectively transcended the cat
egories that this thesis has laboured to build.

But before

probing why he is neither Realist nor Idealist but something
else again, it will be shown in what way he is both, in terms
of the possibilities he holds out for man’s ability to proxi
mate an ideal order in temporal history.
Niebuhr's response to the "anything is possible" thesis
of the Idealist school and to the "nothing is possible" anti
thesis of the Realist school, is complex, not simple.
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sists of a moving dialectic rather than a series of fixed
propositions.

To maintain the proper balance between

demands constant attention.

Niebuhr sees man in part

in part bound by necessity —

the two,
free and

to overstress man* s freedom

leads to benign optimism; to overstress his finiteness leads
to destructive pessimism.
other.

Each perspective must balance the

Yet to cut through all this to the heart of the mat

ter, reveals some very elegant fence-sitting.
There is no possible doubt that Niebuhr places limi
tations on man's progress.

One could cite passages from every

book and article that he has ever written to document this
statement; typical are the followings
The contradiction (between the ideal and the
temporal) is recognized as a permanent element
in man's historic situation.
2
One of the really ludicrous aspects of modern
culture, particularly in America, is that the
idea of the perfectibility of man is so uni
versally accepted (Americans being the only
unreconstructed heirs of the French Enlighten
ment ) ... .
3
... (T)here is no point in history, whatever the
cumulations of wisdom and power, in which the
finiteness of man is overcome so that he could
complete his own life, or in which history as v,
such does not retain the ambiguity of being
rooted in nature-necessity on the one hand
while pointing towards transcendent, 'eternal'
and trans-historical ends on the other hand....
Only gradually is it realized that man's ef
forts to deny and to escape his finiteness in
imperial ambitions and power add an element of
corruption to the fabric of history and that
2Faith and History, op.cit.. p.197.
3pjous and Secular America, op.cit.. p.129.
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this corruption becomes a basic characteristic
of history and a perennial problem from the
standpoint of the fulfillment of human history
and destiny.
hBut what does all this really mean in terms of its
practical effects?

One is constantly moved, in reading Sein

hold Niebuhr, to question the character and scope of the lim
its that he thinks restricts man in the attainment of the ..
ideal in history.

Niebuhr seems content however, as in the

above quotations, merely to assert that the limits do exist,
based on the Biblical insight or revelation of his view of
man.

He may describe them as self-assertiveness, but he is

adamant in his refusal to specify them in concrete terms, for
to claim to know the exact limits of human perfection other
than that the Absolute is not possible, is to claim Divine
knowledge.

Perhaps one might agree with Niebuhr that if it

is prideful to abolish all limits, it must surely be no less
so to claim to know them or seek to define them.

Thus Niebuhr

criticizes all natural law theories for portraying man as a
being with a fixed and structured nature, and for compromising
too readily with historical phenomena which man may increas
ingly master.^
Thus Niebuhr can provide for a society which is open
to change.

He asserts that progress is always possible:

^The Nature and Destiny of M a n . op.cit.. vol.II, p.1*.
?Ibid.. vol. I, p.178, 281; vol. II, p >8,55,281.
Also Christian Realism and Political Problems, op.cit., pp.3,
200-01; An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, op.cit.. pp.H-1-6.
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It must be agreed that history means growth,
however much the pattern of growth may be ob
scured by the rise and fall of civilizations.6
Human freedom Is undoubtedly capable of his
torical growth. Civilized man enjoys a degree
of freedom which primitive man did not have.
In the same way the mature man has greater
freedom over nature than does the child. This
growth of freedom imparts a forward movement
to human history.
7
The community must constantly re-examine the
presuppositions upon which it orders its life,
because no age can fully anticipate or predict
the legitimate and creative vitalities which
may arise in subsequent ages,
8
His assessment of the crisis of modern times brings out
this qualified optimism perhaps even better.

This is, he says,

an 'hge between the ages", when "one age is dead and the other
is powerless to be born."

The age of absolute national sover

eignty is over $ but the age of international order under po
litical instruments, powerful enough to regulate the relations
of nations and to compos® their competing desires, is not yet
born.

For,
... we do not know how soon and to what degree
mankind will succeed in establishing a tolerable
world order. Very possibly we will hover for
some centuries between success and failure ...
fi
°Ihe Mature and Destiny of Ma n , op.cit., vol.II,p.315.
?The Structure of Nations and Empires, op.cit.. p.288.

8The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness.
op.cit., p.S 3 .
^Discerning the S i m s of the Times. Hew York, 19i+6,

ppAO-l,^
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In this manner, Niebuhr has his cake and eats it too.
He can speak of "perennial necessities" and "constant factors"
in politics and still consider himself an historical relativ
ist.

He can criticize utopian schemes which only lead to

frustration and disappointment, and still avoid being an ob
scurantist or a reactionary.

He can support liberal causes

without basing that support on some mild illusion as to the
virtue of the reform or the effects of its implementation.
The significance is that while Niebuhr can deny, on the basis
of his assessment of man's nature, that man can ever be per
fect, or that progress is limitless, he has succeeded in making
those limitations meaningless in political terms. Just in the
nick of time, the much-abused liberal creed (or at least a
significant piece of it) has been snatched back from the brink
of the abyss.
Yet surely the question can be asked at this points
"progress" toward what?

Does Niebuhr mean to say that there

may be Indeterminate progress on earth toward his ideal realm the Heavenly City —

wherein all men are perfectly related to

each other in divine sacrificial love?

Absolutely not.

The

fact is that not only does Niebuhr hedge his bets with regard
to man's limitations in order to make them meaningless from the
point of view of preventing progress, he does the same thing
with his "best state" and its derived values.
The ideal world of the Heavenly City, characterized as
it is by aaane is not the immediate goal toward which society
Is progressing.

It Is regarded by Niebuhr as a "final and
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absolute possibility”, which is tantamount to saying that it
will never have a social embodiment.

This is not to say that

there is therefore no relationship between the two, but it is
not a question of a direct relationship under the terms of the
definitions.
It is therefore idle to assume that human
society could ever be completely knit to
gether by the perfection of love in which
each carries the burdens of all, and the
anxieties of each are quieted by the soli
citude of all. That Is the vision of the
Kingdom of God, of the Kingdom of perfect
love, which hovers as a possibility and
yet impossibility over all human life. Ac
tually the perfect accord between each man
and his neighbour is constantly violated
by the inordinate concern of each for his
own welfare.
10
The directly relevant norm, in other words, for polit
ical decision and social policy is not lov© but justice, not
the uncoerced self-oblation of the Kingdom of God but the kind
of mutuality that envisages a contrived balance between the
claims and counterclaims of contending social Interests.

Thus

the ”best state” toward which the temporal order is making pro
gress is that to which that order is directly relevant —

an

ideal state characterised by justice, rather than by agape.
Once again the observer is awash in a sea of dialectics.
However, the key to understanding the matter rests in an ade
quate grounding in the relationship between agape and justice.
In the first place, agape by definition, is an Absolute.
Niebuhr bases all his morally normative thought on this con1 discerning

the Signs of the Times. aPL&gAt., p.186.
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cept.

In the second place, he cannot define justice simply

because it has no basis Independent of agape (more will be
said on this later).

Justice is not a definable concept in

Itself, for it is a relational term with Niebuhr.

In the

third place, contrary to the opinions of his reviewers,

he

does not even have a clearly articulated concept of justice
in substantive terms.

His friend and colleague, Emil Brunner,

has said:
Brilliant as Beinhold Niebuhr is in his analysis
of existing social conditions or of historical
movements and cultural trends, this critical
analysis seldom gives rise to definite, concrete
ethical postulates for social action, i
fie who ...
often marveled at the brilliance of his analyses,
nevertheless noted time and again this deficiency
between criticism and construction. And the rea
son for this Is evident: the lack of an adequate
concept of justice .... Anyone ... who in the
name of justice offers a critique of social is
sues or of political policy is thereby under
obligation not only to state what he means by
1justice* but also what concrete choices are de
manded in the name of this ‘justice* he is talk
ing about.
12
This means, in effect, that Niebuhr has to fall back
on Aristotle —

everyone has to have his due.

But this merely

describes the spirit of justice, for the formula contains no
indication of what each man's due Is.

This is probably what

Niebuhr admitted when he stated: "Rules of justice do not fol
low In a 'necessary manner* from some basic proposition of
•^Gordon Harland has attempted to defend Niebuhr in
this regard: the rest discuss Niebuhr's concept of justice as
if this problem did not exist.
*2Bmll Brunner. "Some Remarks on Reinhold Niebuhr's
wfork as a Christian Thinker", Kegley and Bretall, op.cit., pp.30-
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justice.”13, even though ho was wielding the argument against
Aquinas.
What then can Niebuhr say about justice?
this two ways.

He approaches

First, he compares it to agape. Then he breaks

it down into its constituent principles, freedom and equality,
between which a tension must be maintained.
Agaoe and justice cannot be simply Identified, for
agane is transcendent, heedless, and sacrificial.

Justice is

historical, discriminating, and concerned with balancing in
terests and claims.11*' But justice is never something apart
from, or independent of, loves they exist In a dialectical re
lationship.

Love (aeaue) is both the fulfillment and negation

of justice.

Love requires justice in the sense that to be v

•unconcerned for the achievement of a more equal justice is to
deny the claims of love.

But love negates justice for love

transcends the calculation of more and less and does not re
ward according to deserts.

And finally, love fulfills justice

for it provides justice with a rationale.

Justice without love

is merely a balance of power whieh cannot satisfy the special
needs of "others’* if those needs go beyond the general rules of
equity.
Similarly, when Niebuhr attacks justice through the
back door, on® finds nothing but a web of relationships.
■MlJa.i.'fes.gt

One

p.TO.

llfNiebuhr discusses this relationship in many places,
but possibly the best source is The Nature and Destiny of Han.
op.cit., pp.2 ¥+-6 9 .

UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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arrives at each man’s duo (and presumably each nation’s due),
through the regulative principles of freedom and equality.
Heither of these can be held as absolute 5 each threatens the
other and the relation between them is always dialectical.
Absolut© freedom permits the will of the stronger to prevail,
threatening ©quality.

Absolut© equality can be achieved only

by the imposition of force, threatening freedom.
Two facts ©merge from this, after all is said and done.
The first is that Niebuhr only knows of justice theoretically,
in terms of its relationship to three absolutes.

The second

is that Niebuhr's ideal state characterized by agape. must also
by definition be characterized by justice to the extent and
only to the extent that agape requires justice (which is to say
that the Heavenly City enjoys perfect justice but also more
than that).
The implications are clear.

The ambiguity of Niebuhr's

concept of justice is such that one could scarcely predict on
purely a priori grounds whether or not it is capable of attain
ment.

All that is known about it is that it hangs tensely be

tween two poles, approaching first on® and then the other; all
th® while bearing an unspecified dialectical relationship to a
third pole ( M M &
This has led one author to observe*
Thus Niebuhr gives justice no substantive con
tent whatever: justice resides purely in those
procedures which provide men with the oppor
tunity to unseat those in power, is/hat is left
completely open in Niebuhr’s scheme, what has
traditionally been left open in American poli
tical thought, is precisely the content, raean-
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ing, and significance of human freedom. Since
the moral ends of the state remain undefined,
we get no positive case for some absolutely
best regime — but we do gat an exaltation of
democratic constitutionalism.
15
This then is the case for the assertion that Niebuhr
not only equivocates In his limitations of man's march forward,
but he also equivocates when it comes to describing that as
pect of the ideal order which man is marching forward to.

In

other words, Hlebuhr is saying that perfection in terms of the
ultimate ideal (society structured around azane) cannot be at
tained, but what is immediately relevant to man is a norm which
exists in dynamic relation to the ultimate (society structured
around justice derived from and fulfilled by agane) 3 besides
which, no one has any real notion of what this Immediately
relevant norm consists*
If the acid test of a Realist or an Idealist as defined
in this thesis lies in the proximity of the answer to the ques
tion "what is possible", to one of two extremes (anything and
Kariel, In Search of Authority. New York, 196*f,
p.191.
Robert C. Good, both in his thesis (on.cit., pp. 3131*0 and in his article in the Journal of Politics. "The National
Interest and Political Realism", vol.22, I960, pp.597-619, has
valiantly attempted to defend Niebuhr her®. Taking such state
ments of Niebuhr's as* "The problem of justice is finally more
important than the problem of order, but not immediately so.
The instruments of justice can function only within a frame
work of order", Good proceeds to argue that the goal of jus
tice in a society is always held in tension with the goal of v
order. The results are disastrous. Not only would this mean
that Niebuhr associates something with justice that la inimical
to order (such as "anarchy", or "freedom" unbalanced by "equal
ity" ), but it would mean that Niebuhr's "best state" is in fact
a "second-best state" where insurrection is likely if it pur
sues a policy of equal justice too strongly.
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nothing), then Niebuhr must he seen as a ',bridgebuild©^,,. He '
has thus contrived to remain poised between an irresponsible
cynicism and an equally irresponsible utopianism, for while
escaping both extremes in their characteristic illusions, he
has been able to distil from each the richness of their in
sights into the nature of man and history.

However it should

not be thought that this has been don® without cost.

The

price of his Idealism is such that it has robbed his Realist
limitations of much of their content* the price of his Realism
is such that his ethical thought attempts to hide its nudity
in a shroud of Kantian formalism.

An abstract justice bolstered

by a transcendental agape may offer a vision of higher possi
bilities, but it hardly provides a workable yardstick of eth
ical discrimination.
If it is assumed as has been the case throughout this
thesis, that the only way the ideal and empirical orders can
be related in history is in terms of the extent to which the
latter can realize the goals of the former, then the discussion
is ended.

But Niebuhr sees yet anotherway in which they are

'

related in history.
This relationship is a dialectical one of meaning. The
Christian faith affirms that the same Christ who discloses the
sovereignty of God over history is alsothe perfect norm of
human nature.

He is the second Adam as well as the Son of

God — existence and essence.

As the incarnate revelation of

the paradoxical relationship between Divine justice and mercy,
He discloses the ultimate mystery of the relation of the Divine
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to history.

This revelation clarifies the meaning of history;

for the judgment of God preserves the distinction of good and
evil in history, and the mercy of God finally overcomes the
sinful corruption in which man is Involved on every level of
moral achievement.

The Kingdom of God and the Earthly City

are related as essence to existence through Christ in history.
To the Greeks, the Christ is foolishness because he represents
a disclosure of the eternal in history.

But to declare as

Niebuhr does, that a disclosure of the eternal will and pur
pose is both possible and necessary, is to accept the paradox
of man and history in its quintessence.

It is to understand

that man is, even in the highest reaches of his transcendent
freedom, too finite to comprehend the eternal by his own re
sources.

But it is also understood that man is, even in the

deepest involvement of finitud© and nature, too free of nature
to be blind to the possibilities of a disclosure of the Eternal
which transcends him.

The love which Is embodied in the Cru

cifixion is the golden cord which establishes an ultimate re
lationship in mystery and meaning between history and the Ab
solute.

Niebuhr has gone beyond the terms of this thesis.
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